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ABSTRACT

This last of a series of reports on the implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in Ohio, from the inception of the program in 1974 through mid-1976, compares 16 of the 17 prime sponsors in the State. The monograph describes and explains patterns of influence over decisionmaking about CETA at the local level, a variety of programmatic choices, and patterns of client usage and service. Comments are also made on the roles of the State and of the Chicago regional office of the Department of Labor with regard to Ohio prime sponsors. The authors conclude there are three main problems and three principal achievements of CETA in Ohio. The problems relate to decreased or low level service to the most disadvantaged of eligible CETA clients, less attention to training and work-experience programs, and a vague and shifting Federal role in CETA. The principal achievements discussed are innovative and seemingly successful programs developed by some prime sponsors in the face of political and economic pressures, growing professionalism of the CETA system, and some meaningful and influential involvement in CETA decisionmaking through manpower planning councils. Recommendations are made regarding client service patterns, program comprehensiveness, public service employment, manpower planning councils, the regional office of the Department of Labor, and the State. The report also includes charts illustrating models of CETA implementation features in prime sponsorships, tables, and a bibliography. (LMS)

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The Implementation of CETA in Ohio

R&D Monograph 44

U.S. Department of Labor
Ray Marshall, Secretary
Employment and Training Administration
Ernest G. Green
Assistant Secretary for
Employment and Training
1977

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PREFACE

The implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in Ohio was the focus of a study conducted from the inception of the program in 1974 through mid-1976. A series of reports (March 1975, September 1975, December 1975, and March 1976), of which this is the last, was prepared in connection with a research project supported by a grant from the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor, by a grant from the State of Ohio, and by resources of the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University. All prime sponsorships in Ohio (17, in fiscal year 1976) were studied, as were the State of Ohio operations and the activities pertaining to Ohio carried out by the Chicago regional office of the Department of Labor.

We are indebted to the many men and women throughout Ohio, in both the national and regional offices of the Employment and Training Administration, who talked with us and often opened their files to us.

The major analysis in this report compares 16 of the prime sponsors in the State (all except balance of State, which requires separate treatment on many points). For the 16 local prime sponsors, we describe and explain patterns of influence over decisionmaking about CETA at the local level, a variety of programmatic choices, and patterns of client usage and service.

In addition, we comment on the roles of the State and of the regional office, although, as we are limited to single cases (the State of Ohio and the Chicago regional office interacting with Ohio prime sponsors), our observations are more tentative.

The authorship of this report is genuinely collegial. The principal investigator takes final responsibility for the material presented, but all of the coauthors made independent input. Responsibility for the analysis in specific sections belongs to Donald Baumer and Carl Van Horn, chapter II; William Oiler, analysis of manpower planning councils; Matthew Filipic, chapter III; Grace Franklin, chapter IV; Janet Galchick, chapters V and VII; Mary Marvel and Carl Van Horn, chapter VI; and Carl Van Horn, chapter VIII. We are also grateful to Hallie Francis and Patti Kirst for the important support services they provided.

CONTENTS

		Page
PREFACE		iii
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	Data Base	1
	The Ohio Prime Sponsorships	1
	Organization of the Report	1
II.	LOCAL DECISIONMAKING INFLUENCE	5
	Manpower Actor Influence on Basic CETA Decisions	5
	Patterns of Influence	8
	Explaining Patterns of Influence	9
III.	TITLE I PROGRAM COMPONENT CHOICES	13
	A Description of Choices Made	13
	Explanation of Program Choices	14
IV.	TITLE I SERVICE DELIVERERS	19
	Selection Processes	19
	Reasons for Selection	19
	Description of Budgetary Changes	21
	Explaining Budgetary Changes	21
	The Employment Service as a Service Deliverer	22
V.	PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM CHOICES	25
	The Magnitude of PSE	25
	Title I PSE	25
	Using PSE to Rehire Public Employees	26
	Transition to Unsubsidized Employment	26
	PSE and Career Growth	27
	PSE Target Groups	28
	Distribution of PSE Jobs	28
VI.	PARTICIPANTS IN CETA PROGRAMS	31
	Title I Participants	31
	Title II Participants	32
	Title VI Participants	34
	Comparisons of Titles	34
	Participant Service Patterns	35

VII. THE ROLE OF THE STATE 41
A Prime Sponsor 41
Coordinator of Employment and Training Services 42

VIII. THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL OFFICE 45
Local Perceptions 45
Field Representatives' Perceptions 48
Decentralization 48
Decategorization 49
Manpower Planning Councils 49

IX. SUMMARY 51
Local Decisionmaking Influence 51
Title I Program Component Choices 51
Title I Service Deliverers 51
Public Service Employment Program Choices 52
Participants in CETA Programs 52
The Role of the State 52
The Role of the Regional Office 53
Summing Up 53

X. CONCLUSIONS 55
A Model for Aspects of CETA Implementation 55
CETA as a Decisionmaking and Policy System 56
Recommendations 57

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 61

TABLES

1. Interviews and meetings, September 15, 1974-July 15, 1976 3
2. Population and labor force characteristics, Ohio prime sponsors 3
3. Base allocations, fiscal 1976, and type of prime sponsorship, Ohio prime sponsors 4
4. Patterns of influence on CETA title I decisions, Ohio prime sponsorships ... 6
5. Patterns of influence on CETA PSE decisions, Ohio prime sponsorships 7
6. Relationship between manpower planning council activity and perceived influence, Ohio prime sponsorships 8
7. Relationship between title I and PSE influence patterns, I 9
8. Relationship between title I and PSE influence patterns, II 9
9. Programmatic emphases compared, fiscal years 1974-76, seven Ohio prime sponsorships 14
10. Planned title I expenditures, by program component, fiscal years 1975-76 14
11. Planned distribution of title I participants, by program component, fiscal years 1975-76 14
12. Achievement of plans, by program activity, title I: March 31, 1975, and March 31, 1976 15
13. Variation in planned expenditures for title I programs, fiscal 1976 modification 15
14. Reasons for selecting all service deliverers, by frequency of response 20
15. Reasons most often cited for selecting types of service deliverers 20
16. Funding level, fiscal years 1975-76, by type of service deliverer and type of change 21
17. Transition to permanent employment from titles II and VI, March 31, 1976, Ohio prime sponsorships 27
18. Relation between explanatory factors and allocation of PSE jobs to prime sponsor agencies 28

19. Aggregate percent change in title I participants, December 31, 1974, June 30, 1975, and March 31, 1976 31
20. Changes in title I participant characteristics in individual Ohio prime sponsorships, December 31, 1974, and March 31, 1976 32
21. Changes in title I participant characteristics in individual Ohio prime sponsorships, June 30, 1975, and March 31, 1976 32
22. Aggregate percent change in title II participants, December 31, 1974, June 30, 1975, and March 31, 1976 33
23. Changes in title II participant characteristics in individual Ohio prime sponsorships, December 31, 1974, and March 31, 1976 33
24. Changes in title II participant characteristics in individual Ohio prime sponsorships, June 30, 1975, and March 31, 1976 33
25. Aggregate percent change in title VI participants, March 31, 1975, and March 31, 1976 34
26. Changes in title VI participant characteristics in individual Ohio prime sponsorships, June 30, 1975, and March 31, 1976 34
27. Summary of participant characteristics in Ohio prime sponsorships, March 31, 1976 35
28. Attitudes concerning preferred client service patterns 37
29. Perceived general impact of regional office on Ohio prime sponsors 45
30. Regional office performance in Ohio, judged by manpower actors 46
31. Summary of opinions of manpower actors on regional office performance in Ohio 47
32. Perceptions of national office performance by Federal field representatives 48

CHARTS

1. A model of CETA implementation features in prime sponsorships 2
2. Empirically supported model of CETA implementation features in prime sponsorships 56

I. INTRODUCTION

The political features of carrying out the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in Ohio were the subject of a study extending from the beginning of CETA in 1974 through mid-1976. As used in this text, the word "political" is broadly defined, including both decisionmaking processes and the content of decisions on the allocation of scarce resources. Within that definition, specific aspects of group politics, electoral politics, intraorganizational politics, interorganizational politics, and the politics of intergovernmental relations must be discussed in order to understand how CETA is implemented. All relationships, of course, could not be given equal attention; focus was on those that the authors felt to be most important and that could be described systematically. Chart 1 is a diagram of the relationships explored in the research.

Data Base

A large, varied data base was used in analyzing the implementation of CETA prime sponsorships in Ohio. It consists of interviews (both closed and open ended) with many of the actors in the manpower system in Ohio; observations of meetings of manpower planning councils and other manpower-related groups; a vast quantity of pre-CETA and CETA documents (Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) materials, CETA letters, field assessment letters and backup materials from the regional office, field memorandums, minutes of council meetings, CETA plans, project planning summaries, budget information summaries, project status summaries, financial status reports, and quarterly summaries of participant characteristics); newspaper clippings; and relevant census and employment service data.

Table 1 lists the number of interviews and the observational data collected. In addition, a variety of short phone calls and informal conversations with many of the actors supplemented information on activities throughout the State.

The closed-ended interviews conducted in the spring of 1976 were particularly important for some of the systematic analysis of decisionmaking and decision content in the Ohio prime sponsorships. Standard interviews were administered personally to four major sets of actors: Professional staff, political officials (mayors, county commissioners, city managers, county administrators), service deliverers, and Federal field representatives. A personal interview was held with virtually every actor in each of the categories. The return rate for questionnaires to all members of manpower planning councils in the State was 60 percent.

The Ohio Prime Sponsorships

Ohio had 14 prime sponsorships in fiscal year 1975 and 17 in fiscal 1976. (And in fiscal 1977, there will be 20.) These sponsorships represent a broad range of labor market and demographic conditions, program sizes, and type of prime sponsorship.

Table 2 presents descriptive demographic and labor market data on the 17 prime sponsorships that existed in fiscal 1976. Data on the size of the CETA programs administered by these 17 prime sponsorships in 1976 and information on the type of prime sponsorship are summarized in table 3.

The Ohio prime sponsorships are not necessarily a representative sample of the 431 prime sponsorships in the United States in 1976. But the great variation summarized in tables 2 and 3 indicates that findings on CETA in Ohio have national implications and utility.

Organization of the Report

Five of the chapters in this report focus on: (1) Patterns of influence over decisionmaking about CETA at the local level in the 16 Ohio prime sponsorships other

Chart 1.
A Model of CETA Implementation Features in Prime Sponsorships


Economic, Social and Governmental Characteristics of the Prime Sponsorship
1. Socioeconomic characteristics of the population
2. Local economic conditions
3. Local social conditions
4. Features of CETA-related governmental and advisory structures
5. Previous manpower programs
CETA-related attitudes of individual actors
National and State Policy
1. Content of statutes, regulations
2. N/DOL interpretations and actions
3. R/DOL actions and interventions
4. State actions and interventions
Local Decisionmaking Influences*
Patterns of relative scope and substantive nature of influence over decision-making by local actors
Elected officials
Professional staff
Advisory council
Service deliverers and other interest groups
Programmatic Decisions
1. Choice of program components
2. Choice of service deliverers
3. Choice of target groups
4. Choice of consortium status and type
5. Choice of internal allocation formula
Client service patterns (use of programs)

*The influence of any actor is explained partly by the activity, concerns, and standing of other actors.

TABLE 1. INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS, SEPTEMBER 15, 1974 - JULY 15, 1976

Activity	Open-ended interviews and meetings observed	Closed-ended[1] interviews and questionnaires
Prime Sponsorships		
Interviews		
Professional staff	207	115
Political figures	41	38
Service deliverers	113	89
Chairpersons of manpower planning councils	18	(2)
Members of manpower planning councils	(2)	194
Meetings observed		
Advisory councils	133	(2)
Others (e.g., committees, staff, consortium boards)	36	(2)
State of Ohio		
Interviews	28	(2)
Meetings observed (manpower services council, other statewide meetings)	19	(2)
Regional office, Department of Labor		
Interviews		
Federal representatives	27	13
Other officials	10	(2)

[1] Note that in analyses reported in the text the number of interviews on any given question will sometimes be slightly less than the total number conducted because some respondents chose not to answer some questions.

[2] Not applicable.

TABLE 2. POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS, OHIO PRIME SPONSORS

Location	Total population, 1970	Blacks in population, 1970 (percent)	High school education or above (percent) 1970	Families below poverty level, (percent) 1970	Families on public assistance or welfare, (percent) [1]1970	Unemployment rate, 1974	Unemployment rate, June 1975	Unemployment rate, May 1976	Civilian labor force, May 1976
State of Ohio	10,651,841	9.1	36.7	7.1	3.8	4.8	9.1	6.9	4,707,450
Akron	761,956	7.2	38.5	5.4	3.5	4.4	9.8	7.7	323,999
Allen	111,144	8.3	35.3	6.2	1.9	5.5	10.5	7.8	51,257
Butler	226,207	4.9	35.9	6.3	3.3	6.3	12.1	8.3	102,736
Canton	459,333	5.0	36.2	5.5	2.7	4.3	8.6	7.4	210,388
Cincinnati	452,550	27.6	34.0	12.2	8.3	[1]5.4	[1]8.4	[1]7.1	[1]409,678
Clark	156,946	8.4	35.0	6.9	3.7	4.8	9.1	7.9	66,907
Cleveland	1,981,477	16.7	37.8	6.6	4.1	4.3	8.7	6.1	845,888
Columbus	833,249	12.5	42.6	7.1	4.5	3.7	7.2	6.3	416,931
Greene	124,422	6.7	41.9	4.9	1.4	4.2	7.8	5.5	48,890
Hamilton	471,468	4.3	36.9	3.7	1.9	[1]5.4	[1]8.4	[1]7.1	[1]409,678
Licking/ Delaware	150,707	1.9	39.0	6.9	2.2	4.5	8.0	7.6	67,699
Lorain	256,843	6.4	34.2	5.6	3.3	5.0	8.5	6.1	117,361
Miami Valley	638,947	13.0	37.9	5.7	2.1	4.8	8.9	6.3	271,089
Northeast	742,550	7.4	35.6	6.3	3.9	5.0	10.6	8.4	325,326
Southwest	254,976	1.3	28.0	9.6	2.3	5.7	9.0	7.3	109,357
Toledo	574,092	9.6	37.8	6.2	4.5	5.4	9.8	6.2	257,471
Balance of State	2,818,546	2.3	33.9	8.9	3.4	5.1	10.1	7.0	1,082,473

[1] Figures are for the totality of Hamilton County, which encompasses both the Cincinnati and (balance of) Hamilton County prime sponsorships. Disaggregated data are not available.

Sources: 1970 census and Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.

TABLE 3. BASE ALLOCATIONS, FISCAL 1976, AND TYPE OF PRIME SPONSORSHIP, OHIO PRIME SPONSORS

[In thousands of dollars]

Location	Base allocations[1]			Type of prime sponsorship	Notes on nature of prime sponsorship
	Title I	Title II	Title VI		
Akron	$4,070	$1,314	$4,920	Consortium	Central city (275,000), its county, and two adjoining counties
Allen	506	332	1,356	County	Single county with small central city (54,000)
Butler	954	601	2,445	County	Single county with two small central cities (68,000 and 49,000)
Canton	1,820	792	2,914	Consortium	Central city (110,000), its county, and one adjoining county
Cincinnati	5,220	997	3,902	City	Central city (453,000)
Clark	644	230	823	County	Single county with small central city (82,000)
Clermont	1,599	494	1,915	Consortium	Five counties—two largely commuter suburban and three rural; no cities over 10,000
Cleveland	14,960	2,875	10,377	Consortium	Central city (751,000), its county (including a suburb of 100,000), and two adjoining counties
Columbus	4,735	986	4,334	Consortium	Central city (540,000) and its county
Greene	368	128	544	County	Single county with small county seat (25,000); largely rural and commuter suburban
Hamilton	1,033	238	1,676	County	Balance of county for Cincinnati; suburban but with considerable industrial base of its own
Licking/ Delaware	714	254	937	Consortium	Two county consortia adjoining Columbus; one with small central city (42,000); rural and commuter suburban
Lorain	992	485	1,848	County	Single industrial county with two small central cities (78,000 and 53,000)
Miami Valley	4,621	1,028	3,782	Consortium	Central city (244,000), its county, and adjoining rural county
Northeast	4,194	1,590	6,216	Consortium	Central city (141,000), its county, and three other counties (two over 100,000)
Toledo	3,416	1,324	5,214	Consortium	Central city (384,000), its county, and one adjoining county
Balance of State	12,780	5,045	19,613	Balance of of State	58 counties, mostly rural and small town. Only one county over 100,000

[1] These figures do not include the transition quarter. The title I figures do include the consortium incentives.

Source: *Federal Register*, Dec. 18, 1975.

than balance of State, (2) title I program component choices made at the local level, (3) service deliverers at the local level, (4) public service employment program choices made at the local level, and (5) patterns of client usage of the services provided. Chapters VII and VIII discuss the roles of the State in Ohio and of the regional office of the Department, while chapter IX provides a summary and chapter X some general conclusions.

II. LOCAL DECISIONMAKING INFLUENCE

In making CETA decisions within prime sponsorships five sets of actors may be involved: Elected officials and their immediate assistants, referred to as *political officials*; the *professional staff* members of the CETA unit in the prime sponsorship (and/or in the partners of a consortium); the *service deliverers* who administer the programs in the prime sponsorship; the *manpower planning council*; and the *Federal representative* from the regional office assigned to the prime sponsorship.

Substantial variations among the prime sponsors and in the patterns of influence over different kinds of decisions were anticipated in assessing the influence that these groups and individuals exert in manpower decisions. To test these assumptions and to develop concrete descriptions of local decisionmaking influence, the project asked all manpower actors to rate the influence of the actors cited above in making nine different kinds of decisions:

1. Determination of title I program mix (the relative amount of funds and clients involved with classroom training, on-the-job training (OJT), work experience, and public service employment).

2. Selection of title I service deliverers.

3. Determination of general character of title I participants (nature of individuals to be served in title I programs).

4. Identification of title I significant segments (which involves language formally submitted to the Department of Labor about priority groups to receive service).

5. Choice of agencies to receive public service employment slots.

6. Determination of public service employment goals (for example, a focus on rehiring laid-off city or county employees, a focus on new services for the community, or a focus on serving the disadvantaged).

7. Determination of general character of title II participants.

8. Determination of general character of title VI participants.

9. Identification of significant segments for public service employment.

The first of the following three sections describes the influence of different manpower actors in different prime sponsorships and substantive areas. The second develops several general patterns of observed influences, and the third proposes some explanations for the different patterns.

Manpower Actor Influence on Basic CETA Decisions

Title I Decisions

The influence pattern perceived by all manpower actors in each prime sponsorship for four different kinds of title I decisions was analyzed. From data on the most important and the second most important actors, the general pattern for the entire State was ascertained (based on an aggregation of the 16 prime sponsorships other than balance of State), as well as the pattern for each individual prime sponsorship. Table 4 summarizes and supports several general observations and speculations:

1. The professional staff emerges as dominant on most title I decisions in most prime sponsorships.

2. The Federal representative emerges as the actor consistently least important. Despite grumbling about regional office activity and Federal controls, the Department of Labor, at least in the person of the Federal representative, is not influential on title I decisions.

3. Political officials (including elected officials and nonelected executives such as city managers) have con-

TABLE 4. PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE ON CETA TITLE I DECISIONS, OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS

Type of decision	Statewide pattern	Variation among prime sponsorships (number of cases)
1. Program mix in title I	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (5) Staff-manpower planning council (4) Staff-service deliverers (3) Political officials-staff (2) Political officials-manpower planning council (1) Manpower planning council-service deliverers (1)
2. Selection of title I service deliverers	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (6) Staff-manpower planning council (3) Staff-service deliverers (3) Political officials-staff (1) Manpower planning council-staff (2) Manpower planning council-political officials (1)
3. Title I client decisions	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (4) Staff-manpower planning council (5) Staff-service deliverers (6) Political officials-staff (1)
4. Title I significant segments	Staff-manpower planning council	Staff-political officials (3) Staff-manpower planning council (5) Staff-service deliverers (4) Staff-Federal representative (2) Manpower planning council-staff (2)

siderable influence on some title I decisions especially choices about program mix and the selection of service deliverers. With limited time for CETA, they do not ignore title I but rather intervene selectively, particularly in those two areas in which the decisions involve dollar allocations. Decisions about clients, in which they are less influential, and decisions about significant segments, in which they are least influential, do not directly involve dollar allocations.

4. Manpower planning councils range from positions of no importance in some prime sponsorships to the highest importance in a few. Overall, the councils seem to have most influence in the choice of significant segments, a choice that may or may not have much practical impact. But councils also appear with some frequency as at least the second most important actor in all of the other title I decisions investigated. Three prime sponsorships in particular were found to have generally active, important, and influential councils—two in consortia formed around large central cities and one in a small single-county prime sponsorship. Their influence was spread over all title I decisions and was nearly equal to staff and political official influence.

5. In general, the role of the manpower planning councils in title I decisions seems largely determined by whether the political officials become involved. Where political officials are heavily involved, the councils tend not to be influential.

6. Service deliverers retain an important voice in manpower decisions in some prime sponsorships, but in no case do they dominate. Their greatest influence is in the area of title I client choice. Despite rhetoric about significant segments, in fact, the daily choices made by service deliverers determine, ultimately, the kind of individuals title I programs serve.

Public Service Employment (PSE) Decisions

Five PSE-related decision areas were analyzed in the same way as title I-related decisions (see table 5). As a result, several generalizations may be made:

1. Politial officials are the dominant actor in decisions about the allocation of PSE slots to specific agencies. This is where the heart of PSE "action" is—where the funds go and what activities and agencies are supported. It is not surprising, therefore, that most political officials make their major effort to influence CETA decisions at this point.

2. Although political officials are important in all other PSE decisions as well, in general, they are second in importance to staff. Political officials are more concerned and involved with PSE decisions than with title I decisions.

3. Perhaps it is surprising that staffs remain as important in PSE as they do and are not overwhelmed by the

TABLE 5. PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE ON CETA PSE DECISIONS, OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS

Type of decision	Statewide pattern	Variations among prime sponsorships (number of cases)
1. Choice of agencies to receive slots	Political officials-staff	Political officials-staff (9) Staff-political officials (6) Staff-manpower planning council (1)
2. Title II clients	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (8) Political officials-staff (6) Staff-manpower planning council (1) Staff-Federal representative (1)
3. Title VI clients	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (8) Political officials-staff (5) Staff-manpower planning council (2) Staff-Federal representative (1)
4. PSE significant segments	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (10) Political officials-staff (1) Staff-manpower planning council (2) Manpower planning council-staff (1) Manpower planning council-Federal representative (1) Political officials-manpower planning council (1)
5. PSE goals	Staff-political officials	Staff-political officials (10) Political officials-staff (3) Staff-Federal representative (2) Political officials-manpower planning council (1)

interest and influence of the political officials. On the other hand, they may retain the appearance of influence by adeptly anticipating the wishes of the political officials on PSE matters and by shaping their own decisions accordingly, despite, in a number of cases, differing personal preferences.

4. The other actors—manpower planning councils, Federal representatives, and service deliverers—have very little influence on any PSE decisions, with the partial exception of a few councils in relation to the symbolic statements about PSE significant segments.

Manpower Planning Councils

In addition to the perceptual data gathered on manpower planning council influence, there was access to minutes of virtually all council meetings in the State since the beginning of CETA and personal observation of many meetings over the past 2 years.

As already indicated, the perceptual data suggest a wide variation in MPC influence from one prime sponsorship to another. For all nine decision areas analyzed, the MPC appears to be highly influential in three prime sponsorships, moderately influential in five, and relatively uninfluential in eight. In substantive terms, MPC's are most likely to influence decisions about title I significant segments, the selection of title I service deliverers, and title I program mix. They are least likely to influence PSE matters.

In assessing the activity of the MPC's in the Ohio prime sponsorships, project staff used the following measures:

(a) The number of meetings held per year; (b) the number of recommendations made; (c) the average number of recommendations per meeting; (d) the number of recommendations made to influence staff, political officials, and service deliverers (excluding those recommendations that have impact only on the MPC itself); and (e) the number of recommendations dealing with each of the nine decision areas analyzed.

These criteria made possible a comparison of activity with perceived influence to reach a judgment about overall MPC influence. Analysis of the measures revealed the following broad patterns of activity:

1. Only one MPC in the State consistently met more than once a month. Six met once a month, and the remaining nine met less often.

2. The number of recommendations made by councils varied from more than 100 to fewer than 10 during 2 years.

3. Over half of the recommendations did not deal with the nine decision areas on which the study focused. Many related to internal workings of the council itself (bylaws, committee structure, and so on).

4. Most MPC recommendations were aimed at staff. About 20 percent of the recommendations directed outside were to political officials. Only the most influential planning councils sent recommendations directly to the service deliverers.

5. The two substantive areas most often treated by the MPC's were the selection of title I service deliverers and title I program mix.

Table 6 compares the activity of manpower planning councils with local actors' perceptions of their influence; there is a substantial correspondence between the two. In only 2 of the 16 cases was a council high on one measure and low on the other; in 9 cases the corrrespondence was perfect, and in 5 others a moderate ranking on one measure was combined with a high or low ranking on the other measure. The seemingly deviant cases have reasonable explanations. The council rated high in activity but low in influence met constant opposition to its recommendations from the staff and political officials and, despite persistent activity, was never able to develop influence. The low activity but high influence of the other council came from a small number of formal recommendations, but the sense of the council was relayed informally by staff members to the political officials. The council's position was supported by both staff and political officials in most cases.

The local actors' data presented earlier suggested that MPC's were most influential in choosing title I significant segments, selecting service deliverers, and determining program mix. The activity data support these perceptions with regard to the latter two areas but not the first. Councils spent little time determining significant segments, for either or both of two reasons: (1) It is not an activity that needs constant attention—once it is done, it probably requires no attention or only routine reaffirmation. (2) It is not an activity that has much real importance in many prime sponsorships.

TABLE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANPOWER PLANNING COUNCIL ACTIVITY AND PERCEIVED INFLUENCE, OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS

Council activity	Perceived influence		
	High	Moderate	Low
High	3	1	1
Moderate	0	3	2
Low	1	2	3

NOTE: The entries in the cells represent number of councils.

Patterns of Influence

Title I Decisions

After consideration of all of the above data, plus the comments of a variety of actors given in open-ended interviews over the 2-year period of the study, and the observations and judgments of the authors, it appears that six descriptive models fit reality well in terms of title I decision-making. All six models share the feature that professional staff are important. But in five of the models there is significant sharing of influence with other combinations of actors.

1. Model 1: Staff. The first pattern—which fits four prime sponsorships—is one in which the staff is dominant and no other actor is consistently influential. This does not mean that the staff is completely free to follow its own preferences but that it is dominant because it can anticipate the reactions and preferences of other potentially influential actors.

2. Model 2: Staff-Political Officials. In the second pattern, the prime sponsor staff and the political officials are jointly the dominant actors on virtually all title I decisions. Other actors are relatively unimportant. Three prime sponsorships fit this description.

3. Model 3: Staff-Manpower Planning Council. The staff and the MPC are jointly the dominant actors on all title I decisions in this pattern which also fits three prime sponsorships. Other actors are relatively unimportant.

4. Model 4: Staff-Service Deliverers. In two prime sponsorships, title I decisions are dominated by the staff and the service deliverers sharing influence. Here the MPC and the political officials are relatively uninfluential. This model would have been more typical in the first year of CETA, when the service deliverers were more influential. With the passage of time, other actors have tended to eclipse the service deliverers.

5. Model 5: Staff-Political Officials-Manpower Planning Council. In three prime sponsorships, influence over title I decisions is shared between three groups in a constant pattern of interaction. Only the service deliverers are excluded from an important role.

6. Model 6: Staff-Political Officials-Service Deliverers. A final variant, applicable in only one prime sponsorship, also shows influence shared three ways, but with the service deliverers replacing the MPC as the third participant.

It also makes some sense to collapse these six models into three. Given that the staff is always important, how widely does staff share that importance? In four cases, the staff is the only consistently influential actor. In eight, it shares influence with one other actor and in four, with two other actors.

PSE Decisions

For all PSE decisions, only the staff and the political officials have consistent decisionmaking influence. In two prime sponsorships, the MPC dealt with some PSE questions, but their overall influence still did not come close to the staff or political officials. In the one case where a Federal representative appeared to be important, the role was clearly a secondary one in terms of overall influence. Thus it is possible to fit all Ohio prime sponsorships into three models of influence over PSE decisions.

1. Model 1: Political Officials. In the first model, most major decisions are made by the political officials, a description that fits eight prime sponsorships. Although staff is still involved in implementation of decisions it has little independent influence over their content.

2. Model 2: Staff-Political Officials. In this model, the staff and the political officials share decisionmaking influence, with neither one consistently dominant. This model fits six prime sponsorships.

3. Model 3: Staff. In two cases, the staff is dominant by itself even over PSE decisions. In these cases, the political officials have chosen not to become heavily involved in any aspect of CETA, including PSE.

Overall Influence

The different patterns for title I decisions and PSE decisions are cross-tabulated in tables 7 and 8.

In table 7 the six models developed for title I and three PSE models show some clear relationships. In all cases in which the political officials were consistently involved in title I decisionmaking, they were the dominant group in PSE decisionmaking. In only one case did political officials who were not influential in title I decisionmaking assume a dominant position in PSE. Thus PSE influence patterns in which the staff and the political officials share decisionmaking influence, or in which the staff dominates, nearly always occur in prime sponsorships in which the political officials have taken a minimal interest in title I decisions. Where MPC's are influential in title I, without the political officials also being involved, decisions about PSE are shared between the staff and the political officials. Where MPC's are influential in title I along with political officials, the political officials are dominant in PSE decisionmaking. The only two cases of staff dominance in PSE occur in prime sponsorships in which the staff also dominates title I decisionmaking.

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE I AND PSE INFLUENCE PATTERNS, I

Title I patterns	PSE patterns		
	Staff	Staff-political officials	Political officials
Staff	2	2	0
Staff-political officials	0	0	3
Staff-manpower planning councils	0	3	0
Staff-service deliverers	0	1	1
Staff-manpower planning councils-political officials	0	0	3
Staff-political officials-service deliverers	0	0	1

TABLE 8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE I AND PSE INFLUENCE PATTERNS, II

Title I patterns	PSE patterns		
	Staff	Staff-political officials	Political officials
Staff	2	2	0
Staff and one other actor	0	4	4
Staff and two other actors	0	0	4

Table 8 uses only the three collapsed models for title I decision influence as well as the three PSE models and underscores in a somewhat different way the relationship between the two patterns of influence. The political officials are never solely dominant on PSE in cases in which the staff is dominant alone on title I. Or, put another way, a staff dominant on title I decisions will at least share influence on PSE decisions. Similarly, where a staff shares influence on title I decisions with two other actors it will not even share influence on PSE decisions. Where a staff shares influence with one other actor on title I, it has retained a share of influence in half of the cases on PSE. It has never been dominant and has lost any major influence in the other half of the PSE cases.

Explaining Patterns of Influence

Prime sponsors in the State of Ohio have been shown to make manpower decisions in different ways. How are variations in the influence of manpower actors accounted for? Three factors apparently affect local decision-

making—the orientations of the actors themselves, certain features of the staff or of the local political and governmental environment, and economic conditions.

Orientation of Manpower Actors

According to the data presented above, manpower staffs throughout the State are the most important group in CETA decisionmaking, although their influence varies systematically. The idea of autonomy is useful in discussing the influence of prime sponsor staffs. In some prime sponsorships, the staff constantly attempts to anticipate the wishes of the political officials. They may have some input into manpower decisions, but their influence is clearly subordinate. They rarely, if ever, offer any resistance to the wishes of the political officials. In this arrangement, staff autonomy is low. The situation is quite different in other prime sponsorships where the staff operates with the political officials in the background. In some cases, the staff has chosen to promote an active advisory council, while in others, they have tried to restrict the activity of any competing manpower actors, including the council. The staff enjoys a high degree of autonomy in relation to the political officials.

Political Officials. Staff autonomy is determined by the experience of the staff, especially the manpower director, and the level of interest in CETA of the political officials. Where staff experience is high and the interest of the political officials is low, the staff will be autonomous. Where staff experience is low and the interest of the political officials is also low, the staff will usually be autonomous because the staff tends to gain experience faster than the political officials. Where political officials' interest is high and staff experience is low, the staff will have low autonomy. In cases where an experienced staff and interested political officials coexist, the usual result is low staff autonomy, although their degree of subordination is less than in prime sponsorships with interested political officials and an inexperienced staff.

The evidence suggests that the political officials in the State are substantially more involved in manpower decisionmaking under CETA than before CETA. They now spend much more of their time on manpower issues, since the large increase in PSE funds. Decisions about the allocation of dollars seem to be their primary concern.

Those political officials most active in CETA decisionmaking appear to want either to change the existing manpower system or to prevent change in a system they find satisfactory. Their attitude toward their own involvement usually determines the influence of other actors. Most active political officials do not appoint forceful, aggressive staff members. In one prime sponsorship, however, officials joined with an experienced staff director to change the existing system. In three other prime sponsorships, active political officials supported the development of a strong manpower planning council; in other cases they opposed the establishment of such a council. In prime sponsorships in which the political officials are influential and have fought against the participation of other groups, substantial use is made of title I funds for PSE.

As indicated earlier, the political officials tend to be much more involved in PSE than title I. In fact, in only two prime sponsorships are political officials not involved in PSE decisions.

Through their involvement in PSE, political officials have increasingly attended to title I decisions. In most of the small suburban and/or rural prime sponsorships, political officials were at first little interested in CETA. Owing to increases in PSE funding in fiscal years 1975 and 1976 however, many officials assumed a greater role in manpower decisionmaking both in title I and in PSE.

Despite these developments, political officials in two prime sponsorships have been uninterested in either title I or PSE; in nine prime sponsorships, they have not been significantly involved with title I programs. Most of these officials believe that CETA programs cannot benefit them but may be potentially damaging. They want to avoid any embarrassing or controversial issues associated with CETA. When such issues arise, some political officials take an active role. In other cases, the political officials dissociate themselves from the programs and let the staff and/or the planning council take responsibility for decisions. Anxiety regarding potentially damaging publicity, however, more often works as an indirect influence because staff members are aware that they may function independently only so long as they do not foster any noticeable controversy.

Manpower Planning Councils. The influence of manpower planning councils depends on two principal factors: (1) The attitude of the staff and the political officials toward council participation in CETA decisions. If these groups support an active council, then the necessary groundwork for an influential council has been laid. If they oppose an active council, there is virtually no chance that the council will have much influence. (2) The attitude of the council members themselves. If they believe that their recommendations are being taken seriously and that the time they devote to CETA benefits the programs, they participate vigorously. One way to foster this feeling among council members is to assign major responsibility to them. The complicated problems CETA presents increase their sense of commitment to the programs and improve the quality of their recommendations.

The influence of service deliverers in CETA decisionmaking has declined dramatically over the past 2 years. Decline has been greatest in prime sponsorships in which the service deliverers have been kept off the planning councils, thus having no official forum in which to present their views. They have remained influential in

prime sponsorships in which they were firmly entrenched through years of previous manpower experience. The continued influence of service deliverers occurs where the political officials are not motivated to change the existing programmatic emphasis. In many of the larger cities in the State, attempts to change the existing system have often caused some antagonism between the political officials and the service deliverers. The usual result has been a diminishing of the decisionmaking influence of the service deliverers, who, until this time, had been very powerful voices in manpower decisionmaking in the large cities. Overall, the service deliverers were more influential in the smaller prime sponsorships where neither staff, political officials, nor planning council have much manpower expertise. This pattern is gradually changing as the staff in these areas develops expertise, and as the growth of PSE draws the attention and participation of the political officials.

Staff Structure and Local Governmental Features

Certain features associated with the organizational structure and the location of the prime sponsor staff in local government also appear to affect the influence of local actors. In some prime sponsorships, the CETA staff operates as part of a regular city or county department, the CETA director may even be a cabinet-level appointee. The staff then becomes much more responsive to the demands of the political officials than is the case when the staff operates in other administrative locations. This pattern is particularly noticeable during mayoral races or in partisan turnovers. Those prime sponsor staffs closely affiliated with the regular machinery of local government have greater autonomy and greater insulation from political considerations.

Among consortia, there have been two locations for the prime sponsor staff. They may become part of the city/county government of a jurisdiction in the consortium, or they may serve as the administrative staff of a consortium that has become an independent legal entity in the form of a regional commission. Overall, the political officials in a multijurisdiction consortium are more active in CETA decisionmaking, partly to insure that their jurisdictions receive a fair allocation of CETA funds. In consortia that have become regional commissions, this concern is particularly prevalent because the decision to become a regional commission is usually based on the partners' reluctance to have any one jurisdiction in the governmental structure house the prime sponsor staff.

The form of local government also seems to affect the influence of the different actors in a prime sponsorship. In most strong mayor systems, the mayor is active in CETA decisions. City managers, on the other hand, do not take such an active role. Furthermore, those city managers who do participate do not try to restrict the activity of other interested groups such as the planning council or the service deliverers. The prime sponsorships in which the political officials have appointed relatively weak staffs and have tried to restrict the participation of other actors in CETA decisions have all been large cities with strong mayors.

The organizational characteristics of most prime sponsor staffs in the State are very similar. There is one organizational variable, however, that appears to be related to the influence patterns. In all prime sponsorships where the political officials do not dominate PSE decisions, there are one or more persons responsible for monitoring PSE operations on the prime sponsor staff. Only three of the prime sponsorships in which the political officials are dominant on PSE have such an arrangement. The presence or absence of such persons on the prime sponsor staff is a good indication of the activity of the staff in PSE. In most cases where the political officials dominate PSE decisionmaking, the prime sponsor staff leaves PSE operations to the political officials and their subordinates in local government. This usually means that the PSE programs will be operated out of either the city/county personnel office, or the finance or budget office.

Economic Conditions

The unemployment rates in all prime sponsorships rose noticeably during fiscal 1975 and in most prime sponsorships peaked in February, March, or April. In fiscal 1976, the unemployment rates declined, but remained higher than they were in late fiscal 1974 and early fiscal 1975. The highest rate in Ohio was 15 percent, which was reached in two prime sponsorships. At the other end of the scale, the highest rate ever reached by one prime sponsorship was 7.5 percent. The other 14 prime sponsors registered peak unemployment rates between 8.5 percent and 11.5 percent. In most prime sponsorships rising unemployment appeared to have heightened the interest of political officials in CETA, especially PSE. One mayor expressed it this way: "When unemployment is low, the manpower division is just another agency; now it is important. The benefits are spread around and the programs are a political asset, not a liability." This pattern of increased political official involvement in response to rising unemployment, however, does not include all prime sponsors in the State, nor is it traceable only to those prime sponsorships with the highest rates of unemployment. Some political officials, still recognizing in CETA the possibility of embarrassment or damaging controversy, kept their distance from the programs.

Fiscal crises in some local governments roused the interest of involved political officials in CETA. Attempts

were made to use CETA funds to support local government personnel who were laid off. During such a crisis, the political officials usually have one of their cabinet-level deputies assume direct control of the local PSE programs. The existence of fiscal crises and the use of title I funds for PSE are also related. In prime sponsorships where local governments have had fiscal crises, there is greater use of title I PSE.

III. TITLE I PROGRAM COMPONENT CHOICES

A most important decision that is clearly the responsibility of each prime sponsor is the choice of programs to be funded with title I money. Although literature on the planning process is growing, little in the manpower literature offers definitive guidance to prime sponsors on what specific programs might be most effective under different economic conditions.[1]

In the absence of clear external guidance—even if such guidance were available it would not have to be sought or heeded—prime sponsorships have had to proceed empirically and intuitively in making their program component choices. This section assesses that empirical experience, attempts to describe the choices that have been made, and offers some explanation for the patterns that have emerged.

A Description of Choices Made

Table 9 provides summary information on changes in plans in seven Ohio prime sponsorships for which there is information for 1974 (the last pre-CETA year) as well as 1975 and 1976. In terms of planned participants, training programs (both classroom and on-the-job) fell dramatically in 1975 but regained in numbers of participants (but not budget) in 1976. The drop in the relative importance of training programs is related to the national economy's severe problems (reflected in these seven local economies) beginning in late 1974. The diverging trends in participants and in planned expenditures are partly the result of an increased use of title I for public service employment. PSE is the most costly of CETA programs when figured on a per slot basis. (For example, the average planned expenditure per PSE participant in Ohio was about $6,000, compared with about $1,000 for each work-experience participant, $1,200 for each participant in classroom training, and $1,400 for each OJT participant.)

Tables 10 and 11 provide summary data on planned expenditures and distribution of participants by program component for all 14 Ohio prime sponsorships in existence in both 1975 and 1976. Classroom training has remained fairly stable in its share of participants while gradually losing in its share of expenditures. A similar pattern can be seen in OJT. Work-experience programs have gradually lost their share of participants, but have increased their share of planned expenditures. The explanation is that a number of prime sponsors have served increasing numbers of adults with full-time work-experience jobs at wages substantially above the minimum and in some cases with fringe benefits.

Tables 10 and 11 show the most dramatic change in the case of title I PSE, which made substantial gains both in dollars and participants.

The data presented thus far come from plans, and these are transformed into actual behavior with varying degrees of success. Table 12 contains data on the percent of Ohio prime sponsors achieving at least 85 percent of their plans in terms of both participants and expenditures for the end of the third quarter in both fiscal 1975 and fiscal 1976. Except for expenditures on OJT and participants in PSE, the performance was substantially better in 1976 than in 1975. There are still a large number of prime sponsors achieving less than 85 percent of their plans, however, with the exception of work experience and participants in classroom training.

Some of this improvement is genuine; some may be based simply on adjusting goals to the ability to achieve them. Considerable improvement is, in fact, the result of improved management by staff members gaining experience in working with manpower programs.

Despite aggregate trends, there is still an enormous variation between prime sponsorships in how they

[1] See C.R. Perry, and others: *The Impact of Government Manpower Programs* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975) for a good summary of the program evaluation literature that underscores the lack of definitive evidence.

TABLE 9. PROGRAMMATIC EMPHASES COMPARED, FISCAL YEARS 1974-76, SEVEN OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS

Item	Distribution of participants to be served						Distribution of planned expenditures					
	Employment programs[1]			Training programs[2]			Employment programs[1]			Training programs[2]		
	1974	1975	1976	1974	1975	1976	1974	1975	1976	1974	1975	1976
Average percentage	54	64	59	46	36	41	36	46	56	64	54	44

[1] Employment programs include those now called public service employment and work experience.

[2] Training programs include those now called classroom training (prime sponsor) and on-the-job training.

Note: Fiscal 1974 data were available for only seven areas that became CETA prime sponsors: Akron Tri-County, Canton-Stark-Wayne, Cincinnati, Cleveland Area, Western Reserve, Columbus-Franklin County, Miami Valley, and Northeast Ohio.

Source: 1974 CAMPS planning documents; 1975 modified project operating plans; and 1976 modified project planning summaries and budget information summaries.

TABLE 10. PLANNED TITLE I EXPENDITURES BY PROGRAM COMPONENT, FISCAL YEARS 1975-76

[Percent]

Program component	Original 1975 plan	Original 1976 plan	Modified 1976 plan through June 30
Classroom training, prime sponsor	37	33	29
On-the-job training	15	10	11
Public service employment	3	7	9
Work experience	33	37	37
Services to participants	10	12	13
Other activities	2	2	1

Note: Entries are unweighted averages for the 14 Ohio prime sponsorships in existence during both years.

Source: 1975 project operating plans; 1976 budget information summaries.

TABLE 11. PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF TITLE I PARTICIPANTS BY PROGRAM COMPONENT, FISCAL YEARS 1975-76

[Percent]

Program component	Original 1975 plan	Original 1976 plan	Modified 1976 plan through June 30
Classroom training, prime sponsor	26	30	28
Classroom training, vocational education	5	6	8
On-the-job training	8	9	11
Public service employment	0	2	4
Work experience	53	48	44
Other activities	7	6	5

Note: Entries are unweighted averages for the 14 Ohio prime sponsorships in existence during both years.

Source: 1975 project operating plans; 1976 project planning summaries.

choose to use their title I money. In a comparison of the original 1975 plan, the major modifications for 1975 filed in the spring of 1975, the original 1976 plan, and the latest 1976 modification (through June 30, 1976), no diminution of variation was found. Table 13 summarizes the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of all Ohio planned expenditures for the latest 1976 modification.

Explanation of Program Choices

Given the latitude granted prime sponsors and especially given the very different patterns of program choices they have actually made, some explanation of what produces different choices should be attempted. In tests of a number of hypotheses, a program's share of the total planned expenditures for the four major types

TABLE 12. ACHIEVEMENT OF PLANS, BY PROGRAM ACTIVITY, TITLE I, MARCH 31, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976

[Percent]

Program activity	Ohio prime sponsors achieving 85 percent or more of plan			
	Participants		Expenditures	
	March 31, 1975	March 31, 1976	March 31, 1975	March 31, 1976
Classroom training, prime sponsor	64	88	50	63
On-the-job training	38	56	54	20
Public service employment	71	67	33	50
Work experience	79	88	64	100

TABLE 13. VARIATION IN PLANNED EXPENDITURES FOR TITLE I PROGRAMS, FISCAL 1976 MODIFICATION

[Percent]

Program component	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Classroom training, prime sponsor	5	63	34	15
On-the-job training	2	48	12	12
Public service employment	0	50	9	13
Work experience	6	86	45	22

Note: Percentages were computed using the sum of the four major programs as the base rather than the total planned expenditure reported by the prime sponsor in its budget information summaries.

of program (excluding "services" and "other activities") was used as the dependent variable. Planned expenditures, rather than planned number of participants, were used because dollars are probably a better measure of the priorities of prime sponsors. Dollars, unlike participants, are much less susceptible to double counting and idiosyncratic interpretations by those filling out the reports. In some cases, data from several different dates are used, but in many cases, data for the dependent variable are derived solely from the original fiscal 1976 plans for all Ohio prime sponsors.[2]

[2]In this section, in alluding to statistical significance the 0.05 level is used. The use of significance tests on a population and not on a sample provides a partial safeguard against taking moderate correlations too seriously. If the number of cases dealt with were a sample, correlations would have to be close to 0.50 for an 0.05 level of significance to be achieved (see H.M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972), pp. 238-39.

Previous Program Choices

One plausible explanation for any given set of program choices is previous program choices.[3] The argument is made that decisions are generally not taken after long and careful analysis of data but rather that analysis and data are both usually very limited; changes are almost never major in relation to what already exists but are almost always relatively minor.

There is substantial evidence that prime sponsors as a rule have not made large changes in their plans. Correlations were run for each program segment between the 1975 modification and the original 1975 plan, between the 1976 original plan and the 1975 modification, and between the 1976 modification and the 1976 original plan. With only one exception, the 12 correlations were very high—six were over 0.75 and five were between 0.57 and 0.69. The one exception is explained by a very large jump in classroom training in one prime sponsorship at a particular time, so even it has little importance.[4]

A qualitative analysis of the specific changes in individual prime sponsorships indicates that change is relatively gradual. In most cases, substantial changes in the plans were rescinded in practice because the constraints on change proved too great. Thus, many of the correlations below 0.75 suggest change that really never materialized.

The notion that decisions about program shares change slowly and in small increments was tested by correlating the share of cumulated expenditures for each major program as reported as of March 31, 1975, with the proposed share of planned spending for each program contained in the fiscal 1976 plan. These correlations were 0.90 for work experience, 0.74 for PSE, 0.68 for classroom training, and 0.40 for OJT. The correlations between the 1976 plan and 1975 plan modification were about the same for classroom training and work experience but substantially higher for PSE (0.88) and for OJT (0.64). Apparently prime sponsors relied more on earlier plans in assigning shares of spending rather than on the empirical evidence of what they were actually able to spend.

In short, despite the increases in planned expenditures for work experience (from 39 percent of planned title I spending in the original 1975 plan to 45 percent in the latest 1976 modification) and title I PSE (from 3 percent

[3]For two classic statements of this position in general, see C. E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, Spring, 1959, pp. 79-88; and O. A. Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, and A. Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review*, September, 1966, pp. 529-47. For major critiques of the position see J. R. Gist, "Mandatory Expenditures and the Defense Sector: Theory of Budget Incrementalism," Sage Professional Papers in American Politics, vol. 2 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 04-020; P. B. Natchez and I.C. Bupp, "Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review*, September 1973, pp. 951-63; and R.B. Ripley and G.A. Franklin, eds., *Policy-making in the Federal Executive Branch* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

[4]The slope and intercept of the line best expressing the linear relationship between any two plans were inspected. These also generally supported an incrementalist view of decisions about planned programmatic expenditures.

in the original 1975 plan to 9 percent in the latest 1976 modification) and decreases in classroom training (from 41 percent to 34 percent) and OJT (from 18 percent to 12 percent), these are changes in emphasis, and have come relatively slowly, largely owing to a deteriorating economy. They are not changes completely altering the shape of manpower programs in Ohio. This also suggests that changes back to the original pattern are likely to occur only gradually, if at all, even under conditions of an improving economy.

The incrementalist explanation that planned spending reflects program choice at any given time is strong but it is certainly not totally satisfying. It does not explain why the pattern emerged as it did in previous time periods, the considerable amount of change that does occur, or important differences between individual prime sponsorships. Are there other possible explanations?

Priorities

Changes and variations may be explained by the priorities of relevant actors in the manpower system. In the systematic interviews of virtually all actors in the spring of 1976 they were asked to rank order their program preferences, using the four major program components analyzed here. Ideal preferences of the actors proved to vary considerably from what they were actually planning to spend. This lends weight to the interpretation that the shift to title I PSE and work experience at the expense of classroom training and OJT was largely a response of events over which individual actors had no direct control—primarily fluctuating economic conditions—rather than an expression of their preferences for employment programs over training programs. The best correlation between preferences and planned expenditures for fiscal 1976 came in the case of work experience (0.51 for all actors and 0.53 for professional staff members alone). The only other relatively high correlation (0.57) was between the preference of all actors and planned OJT spending. The rest of the correlations were very low and, for PSE, negative. This suggests that all actors valued OJT less than staff and that the slippage in classroom training and the increase in title I PSE were not really in accord with "ideal" preferences.

Decisionmaking Influence

Change and especially differences among prime sponsorships may result from the pattern of local decisionmaking influence. There were no strong relationships between the influence rankings from the interviews and planned shares of program expenditures. It is certainly true, however, that the possibility or reality of PSE spending (mostly from titles II and VI) draws political officials into CETA decisionmaking in the first place. As they are drawn into the system, they tend to become more important even in title I decisionmaking. Simple correlations early in the life of CETA, therefore, are probably not good tests of this explanation. As elected officials become more important in CETA decisionmaking in general, including title I spending decisions, their preferences will probably be more accurately reflected in decisions that are actually made. These preferences run more to employment programs than to training programs, probably because of their relatively high visibility and short-term positive political payoff. Thus although there is no hard confirmation of the systematic importance of local decisionmaking influence patterns on the choice of program component priorities, a relationship is indicated. It will probably be some time before this question can be tested adequately.

Local Economic Conditions

Changes in programmatic priorities may also be explained by local economic conditions as measured by the unemployment rate and changes in unemployment. The conventional wisdom that a deteriorating local economy (increasing unemployment) leads to an increase in employment programs and a decrease in training programs may be true. In testing that wisdom, however, only one generalization was confirmed: prime sponsors with a higher unemployment rate did in fact emphasize classroom training less than prime sponsors with a lower unemployment rate (a negative correlation of 0.46 resulted). Although relationship supports the conventional wisdom, it is not overwhelming support, which suggests that the relationship is probably more complex than can be captured with simple correlational techniques, at least when using gross data on aggregate unemployment. If local data on who is unemployed (that is, the proportion of CETA eligibles, those most likely to seek CETA help, and so on) were available, the observed relationships might be stronger. All other correlations between program share and relative unemployment and all correlations between changes in unemployment rates and changes in program budget shares turned out to be not significant.

Partisanship

Partisanship in one of several senses is yet another explanation for some of the changes and variations in the shares of planned expenditures for the four major program components. At the national level, as reflected in debates in Congress and in relations between the Administration and Congress, it may certainly be argued that Democrats are much more supportive than Republicans of direct governmental role in employment; Republicans usually favor programs relying on market-oriented approaches.

Finding out if policy partisanship (as distinguished from what might be called patronage partisanship) was also operative at the local level required three different measures. (1) The party affiliation of the chief elected official (or, in consortia, the dominant elected official or officials); (2) the partisanship of staff members and MPC members; and (3) the two-party vote for the U.S. House of Representatives seat or seats in 1972. Different dimensions in which partisanship could appear would thus be tapped: At the top of the political level; among the most consistently important manpower decisionmakers in the prime sponsorships; and in the community at large.

The analysis thus far, however, suggests that the policy partisanship so in evidence at the national level has almost no relevance at the local level. Correlational analysis produced only one high correlation—that between heavily Democratic community partisanship and a high priority placed on using title I money for PSE (0.44). Even though this relationship was in a direction that national party positions would predict, closer inspection of the data suggests that it may be spurious because it was caused largely by two cases.

Environmental Constraints

A final possible explanation for change and variations in local program priorities is what might be called local environmental constraints. A widely dispersed population would seem likely to make institutional training more difficult, regardless of preferences. Similarly, an absence of established training facilities, at least in the first years of CETA, would also make training difficult to undertake. OJT would seem unlikely in areas in which manufacturing employment was relatively low, given that almost all OJT slots are in manufacturing establishments.

Tests of the relationships between these environmental factors and the planned program expenditure shares offered a good deal of confirming evidence. All of the correlations were in the predicted direction and several were significant. Low population density was correlated positively with a relatively strong emphasis on work experience, whereas high population density was correlated positively with a relatively high emphasis on OJT and classroom training. None of these correlations were significant, however. High population density was correlated both positively and significantly with an emphasis on PSE, a relationship that makes sense given that it is the large cities that have had the fiscal crises, real or imagined, that have led them to use title I for PSE.

The presence or absence of established vocational education programs and facilities was relatively highly correlated with both work experience (a negative correlation of 0.44, which suggests that work experience will be used when such established facilities are not present) and classroom training (a positive correlation of 0.57, which suggests that the presence of such facilities will lead to their use by prime sponsors). Two significant relationships also emerged when program shares were correlated with the ratio of manufacturing jobs to population. There was strong negative correlation between this ratio and work experience (-0.52), which suggests that in the relative absence of manufacturing jobs work experience is the "natural" emphasis for a CETA program to have. There was a strong positive correlation (0.54) between the manufacturing employment ratio and an emphasis on OJT.

In summary, three groups of variables seems to be most predictive of differing programmatic emphases: Previous programmatic emphases, environmental constraints, and, to a more limited extent, the preferences of manpower decisionmakers. Relative unemployment appeared to have limited impact. Policy partisanship appears unimportant at the local level. And more time must elapse to know if different patterns of local decisionmaking influence have predictable and consistent programmatic impacts. The hypothesis, still unsupported (but not disconfirmed), is that they will.

Although a multivariate analysis of only 17 cases is risky, some relatively simple multivariate analysis was used to discover whether the two most important explanatory factors (environmental constraints and actor preferences), in addition to previous program choices, explain program budget shares better together than does either of them separately. In any single multiple regression equation used, the number of independent variables was limited to two. Six multiple regressions were run for each of the four dependent variables (the program shares in the four sets of plans analyzed). Each regression employed one of two preference variables (either that for all actors or that for staff alone) and one of three environmental variables. Good (and significant) explanations of both OJT and work-experience shares were obtained from the use of these two variables together. For OJT, actor preferences had a multiple R of 0.57 and the manufacturing employment ratio had a multiple R of 0.70. That is, OJT is likely to be stressed most in prime sponsorships in which the actors value OJT highly and in which a high ratio of manufacturing jobs to population exists. For work experience, actor preferences had a multiple R of 0.51 and the absence of vocational education schools and facilities had a multiple R of 0.76. That is, work experience receives the highest stress in areas where the actors value it most highly and where established vocational education facilities are absent.

IV. TITLE I SERVICE DELIVERERS

An examination of major aspects of choices made about service deliverers and their budgets in Ohio prime sponsorships used several kinds of data. A number of questions in both open-ended and closed-ended interviews proved relevant. Information on the details of principal service deliverer budgets was collected from 14 prime sponsorships for both fiscal 1975 and fiscal 1976. (Omitted was balance of State; information in two other cases was unobtainable.) A principal service deliverer was defined as one receiving a substantial share of funding or providing important manpower services. Service deliverers were selected by the authors, on the basis of their 2 years of close observation—the employment service and former MDTA skills centers were always included where they were used. Detailed budgetary analysis was limited to seven deliverers in each prime sponsorship.

Selection Processes

Ohio prime sponsorships used both formal and informal techniques for choosing service deliverers for fiscal 1976. Eight sponsorships used a formal request for proposal (RFP) technique. Nine used more informal techniques, but five of these hoped to move soon to a formal RFP process. Level of experience was a poor predictor of which prime sponsorships used a formal RFP process. Five prime sponsorships with considerable pre-CETA experience used an RFP process but so did three prime sponsorships with very little CETA experience (including two that became prime sponsors only in the second year of CETA). Four experienced prime sponsorships did not use an RFP process, as did five with low experience.

Twelve prime sponsorships conducted evaluations of their service deliverers' performance, although three of these evaluations seemed to be quite weak and superficial. In 10 of the areas doing evaluations, the results were used in making decisions about service deliverer selection and contract terms.

Elected officials in all except two of the prime sponsorships were involved in service deliverer decisions. Staff and advisory councils were also heavily involved.

Reasons for Selection

Members of the professional manpower staffs and staff members of service delivery agencies in all prime sponsorships except balance of State were asked to indicate the importance of the following eight possible reasons for choosing specific service deliverers:

1. The absence of alternative deliverers.
2. Prior decisions to serve particular client groups.
3. Economic conditions in the prime sponsorship.
4. Political benefits associated with an agency.
5. Political liabilities associated with an agency.
6. Prior decisions to emphasize programs in which the deliverer specialized.
7. The quality of the deliverer's previous performance.
8. Advice and guidance from the regional office of the Department of Labor.

The prime sponsor staff members were asked to assess the reasons for the selection of each major deliverer by indicating whether each reason was important or not and the single most important reason for the choice of each deliverer. The deliverer staff members were asked to indicate whether each reason was important or not in their own case, but they were not asked about the reasons for the selection of other deliverers. They were requested to comment on the political liabilities associated with other, presumably competing, potential deliverers.

TABLE 14. REASONS FOR SELECTING ALL SERVICE DELIVERERS, BY FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE

Frequency	Service deliverers' response	Professional manpower response
Most often	Prior program decisions	Prior program decisions
	Quality of previous performance	Prior client group decisions
	Prior client decisions	Absence of alternative deliverers
	Economic conditions	Quality of previous performance
	RDOL[1] advice, guidance	Political benefits
	Political benefits	Economic conditions
	Absence of alternative deliverers	RDOL[1] advice, guidance
Least often	Political liabilities	Political liabilities

[1]Regional office, Department of Labor

Table 14 indicates the frequency of the responses of these two sets of actors throughout the State. Both groups of staff members agreed on the most important reasons—prior program decisions—and the least important reasons—political liabilities. In the categories in between, there was general agreement. In only one case—the absence of alternative deliverers—was the rank ordering more than two places different: Very low (seventh) by deliverer staff members and relatively high (third) by prime sponsor staff. The difference is understandable because the prime sponsor staff sees clearly the lack of viable alternatives and the deliverer staff does not have that broad perspective (and, in addition, that may seem like a self-depreciating reason to name for being chosen).

This difference in point of view about the absence of viable alternatives becomes even more marked when the prime sponsor staff responses about the single most important reason are examined. The single reason named most often was the absence of alternative service deliverers. There was also a high degree of correspondence between the rank order judgments of the prime sponsor staff members and their judgments of the single most important reason. On both rankings four reasons emerge as consistently important: Prior program decisions, the absence of alternative deliverers, prior client group decisions, and the quality of previous performance. The other reasons (political benefits, economic conditions, political liabilities, and regional office guidance) had little importance.

When service deliverers were grouped according to type of deliverer, the differences between staff and deliverer opinions about the reasons for the choices that were made were more apparent. Table 15 gives the reason or reasons cited most often in the interviews. Both groups quoted the same reasons, at least in part, for all types of deliverers except skills-training agencies and community-based organizations (including Opportunities Industrialization Centers). One general difference was that staff members never named quality of previous performance most often whereas three groups of deliverers named it.

The views of the prime sponsor staff on the single most important reason for the choice of each class of deliverers were summarized. In four cases—the employment service, skills-training agencies, boards of education, and community action agencies—the absence of alternative deliverers was given most frequently as the single most important reason. Prior program decisions were cited most often by urban leagues, prior client decisions by community-based organizations, and political

TABLE 15. REASONS MOST OFTEN CITED FOR SELECTING TYPES OF SERVICE DELIVERERS[1]

Type of deliverer	Staff response, reasons cited most often	Service deliverer response; reasons cited most often
Employment service ..	Prior program decisions	Peior program decisions
Skill training agency (skills centers, joint vocational schools) .	Prior program decisions	Quality of previous performance
Boards of education ..	Prior program decisions	Prior program decisions
Community action agencies	Prior program decisions; prior client decisions	Absence of alternative deliverers; prior program decisions; prior client decisions
Urban Leagues	Prior program decisions	Quality of previous performance
Community-based organizations	Prior program decisions	Prior client decisions
Political jurisdictions	Economic conditions	Economic conditions; absence of alternative deliverers; quality of previous performance
All service deliverers	Prior program decisions	Prior program decisions

[1]If respondents identified more than one reason with the same frequency, both are listed; otherwise, only the most frequently cited reason is listed.

benefits by political jurisdictions. These data suggest that, if alternatives develop, those who were chosen because of lack of an alternative are most vulnerable to being dropped. Their support from the professional staff is by far the weakest.

Description of Budgetary Changes

The CETA budgets of 83 service deliverers spread over 16 prime sponsorships (all except balance of State) were examined. (There were data for 14 prime sponsorships and more impressionistic data for the other 2.) Of these deliverers, 46 (55 percent) received increases of more than 5 percent in raw dollars in their level of funding between fiscal years 1975 and 1976, 15 (18 percent) had decreases, and 22 (27 percent) remained at a basically unchanged level of funding.

The percent of deliverers receiving increases (both in absolute dollars and in their relative share in percentage terms of the total title I allocation) varied greatly from one prime sponsorship to another. In a few areas, resources were such that all deliverers (or at least all of the seven principal deliverers) received increases. In some other areas none of the deliverers received increases.

More differences emerged when the data were grouped by type of deliverer. Table 16 presents these data in percentage of deliverers in each category receiving increases, decreases, and a constant level of funding. Community-based organizations clearly emerged in the strongest position with community action agencies, political jurisdictions, and Urban Leagues remaining in a relatively strong position. The employment service, skills-training agencies, and boards of education fared worst, although those receiving increases still outnumbered those receiving decreases. This adds weight to the point already made that those agencies selected by the prime sponsor staff primarily because there were no viable alternatives are most vulnerable to funding cuts and/or elimination from the CETA system altogether. Only community action agencies fare reasonably well despite the perception that they were funded primarily because of no viable alternatives. Some prime sponsors, however, were experimenting with what they thought were viable alternatives for skills-training agencies, boards of education, and the employment service.

When data on the size of the average increase or decrease were inspected for deliverers in the system in both years, there seemed to be no particular pattern by type of agency. Average increases varied between 4 and 12 percent, with community action agencies at the high end and political jurisdictions next highest (9 percent).

TABLE 16. FUNDING LEVEL, FISCAL YEARS 1975-76, BY TYPE OF SERVICE DELIVERER AND TYPE OF CHANGE

Type of service deliverer	Percent of deliverers with an increase	Percent with no change	Percent of deliverers with a decrease	Number of deliverers
Community-based organizations	82	9	9	11
Community action agencies	78	0	22	9
Political jurisdictions	75	6	19	16
Urban leagues	71	14	14	7
Skills-training agencies	43	29	29	14
Boards of education work-experience programs	38	38	25	8
Employment service	38	46	15	13

Average decreases varied between 3 and 8 percent, with community action agencies also at the high end and political jurisdictions and boards of education next highest (6 percent).

Explaining Budgetary Changes

A number of plausible factors were examined for their relationship to changes in service deliverer budgets. The results of this analysis are the following:

1. The request for proposal process was found to be most likely to be associated with increases and least likely to be associated with decreases. It is not asserted that a causal relationship exists, but the association itself suggests that the fear of an RFP process on the part of some deliverers who are already being funded is unwarranted.

2. The use of the results of service deliverer evaluations in making decisions about service deliverer budget levels was found to generate change in budgets rather than stability. Prime sponsorships conducting and using evaluations in these decisions were most likely to have

either increases or decreases in budgets (and increases outnumbered decreases), and least likely to have stable budgets. Prime sponsor staffs were evidently putting evaluations to good use, although, of course, it is an open question whether the evaluations were well done.

3. A high degree of publicity of CETA funding possibilities at the local level (either with or without a formal RFP process) also was more likely to be associated with budget increases. Where there was less publicity, budgets tended to be more stable.

4. The involvement of political officials in the decisions about deliverer budgets in many cases benefited the deliverers. Ninety-six percent of all increases came in areas in which political officials were involved. More than half of all decreases, however, were in cases with relatively high political official involvement. In short, political official involvement is associated with change, not stability.

5. The involvement of MPC's in budget decisions also was more likely to be associated with budget increases and only rarely with budget decreases.

6. Partisanship, using the same three measures described earlier, was also analyzed in relation to budget changes. Surprisingly, all three measures suggested that Democratic prime sponsorships were most likely to decrease budgets and least likely to increase them. Rather than the conclusion that Republicans in Ohio are spenders and Democrats are not, two alternative explanations suggest themselves: (1) As in the case of choice of program components, policy partisanship at the local level in CETA may not have much meaning; and (2) the Republican prime sponsorships may have been able to increase more budgets simply because they are in areas that are getting increases in their CETA budgets. Allocation formulas are gradually moving more resources into suburban areas that tend to be more Republican and out of the central cities that tend to be more Democratic.

7. "Entrenchment" of agencies was measured in examining patterns of budget change. The measures included the length of time the agency had been established in the community, pre-CETA manpower service delivery status, and absolute size of budget. In general, it was found that entrenched agencies were not more likely to receive increases or more likely to be immune to cuts than less entrenched agencies. This finding agrees with an earlier one that service deliverers do not appear to be very influential actors in title I decision-making.

8. There seemed to be a relation between what might be called the PSE context and the distribution of budget change for title I deliverers. Naturally, in prime sponsorships that increased the amount of money used for title I PSE, cuts were most likely simply because less money was available for other title I activities. But even when titles II and VI alone were considered, cuts were more likely for title I deliverers if the prime sponsor used more than half of the titles II and VI jobs for prime sponsor agencies (regular units of local government). This is probably because of the spillover effect identified earlier: As political official interest increases, so does PSE, as PSE increases, political official interest in title I also increases; and as political official interest in title I increases, it may be hypothesized that some changes in the critical dollar allocational patterns will occur.

9. Finally, deliverers generally perceived to be performing well (whether formally evaluated or not) were far more likely to receive budget increases than others. Deliverers perceived to be performing poorly or only marginally were much more likely to receive decreases or at least no change. This again suggests that prime sponsor staff are willing to act on their perceptions and to make changes. It also suggests that the "incrementalist" nature of aggregate change in program components discussed previously masks some important changes at a more disaggregated level. Inertia—the basic force that makes the incrementalist argument plausible—is far from dominant when budgets and programs are broken into smaller units for analysis.

The Employment Service as a Service Deliverer

In fiscal 1975, relationships between the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and many prime sponsorships were troubled and unsatisfactory from the point of view of the prime sponsor. Overall, these relationships improved somewhat in fiscal 1976. When asked to assess their relations with the employment service (ES) central office (with which most prime sponsors have to deal), staff members in eight prime sponsorships reported good relations; staff in five prime sponsorships reported poor relations (although they were also called improving in one of these); and those in the other four prime sponsorships reported the relations to be somewhere between good and poor. In only two prime sponsorships did the staff feel that relations had deteriorated from fiscal 1975 to fiscal 1976.

A tangible tie existed between perceived relations and prime sponsor resources allocated to the employment service. In four of the five areas reporting poor relations, the ES lost funding and/or functions. In only one of the areas reporting good relations did the ES suffer cut. Overall, however, the losses were less severe in 1976 than in 1975, and gains tended to balance losses. The ES lost the OJT function in two areas but gained it in another. It lost staff positions in one area, allowance payments in another, and exclusive intake in another, but received large budget increases in four other areas.

Only in one prime sponsorship was the ES cut entirely as a service deliverer.

In summary, the ES still has serious problems in relating to CETA in Ohio in a way totally satisfactory to the prime sponsorships. Limited progress seems to have been made, however. The most pressing problem continues to be overcentralization and overmanagement,[1] limiting the flexibility of ES local and district managers in treating with prime sponsors and forcing prime sponsors to deal with the central office when they would much rather deal with the local or district office.

[1] "Final Report: Management and Administrative Review, Bureau of Employment Services, State of Ohio" (Chicago: U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration (Region V), 1975).

V. PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM CHOICES

The Magnitude of PSE

On the average, the 17 Ohio prime sponsorships spent 65 percent of their CETA funds from titles I, II, and VI on PSE as of March 31, 1976. There is considerable spread in spending patterns: the range is from a low of 45 percent for PSE in two cases to a high of 86 percent in one. In addition to these extremes, three spend between 50 and 59 percent on PSE, six between 60 and 69 percent, and five between 70 and 79 percent. This pattern of variation is in some ways determined by the working of the allocation formulas. But PSE spending is still partially within the control of the prime sponsor in that some have elected to augment their spending by using title I funds and a few have diminished spending by using their titles II and VI funds on other than PSE.

Given the costliness of each PSE slot compared with slots in other programs, the proportion of all CETA enrollees in PSE is, of course, much smaller than the proportion of spending. Nevertheless, in the 17 Ohio cases 30 percent of all CETA participants held PSE slots as of the end of March 1976. Again, there was considerable variation: The range was from 9 to 47 percent. In addition to the two extremes, two had between 10 and 19 percent of their enrollees in PSE slots, six had between 20 and 29 percent, five had between 30 and 39 percent, and two others were over 40 percent.

Similar data for preceding periods show that both PSE spending and percent of enrollment have been growing. Thus, for example, 12 of the 14 prime sponsorships that existed in both fiscal years 1975 and 1976 were spending more on PSE by the end of March 1976 than they were as of June 30, 1975. Twelve also had a higher percentage of enrollees in PSE. The mean spending on PSE for the 14 original Ohio prime sponsorships over time is found to have risen from 26 percent as of December 31, 1974, to 45 percent by June 30, 1975, and to 63 percent as of March 31, 1976. Figures on PSE enrollments as a percentage of all CETA participants for the same three periods rose from 12 to 18 to 28 percent in the original 14 prime sponsorships.

Title I PSE

A decision to use title I money for PSE is within the control of the prime sponsorship. It is allowed by the statute and regulations but is in no sense mandated. Attitudes in the Ohio prime sponsorships among the various actors, including professional manpower staff, range from loathing PSE to viewing it as a temporarily useful program in times of increasing unemployment, as a generally useful manpower program, or fiscal salvation for city and county payrolls endangered by cuts. Given the disagreements among politicians and professional manpower economists on the value of PSE nationally, it is not surprising to find a range of attitudes.[1]

As of March 31, 1976, 10 of the 17 Ohio prime sponsorships were spending at least some title I money on PSE jobs. Spending ranged from 1 percent in one case to 49 percent in another. The 49 percent was clearly aberrant as the next highest spender used only 16 percent of title I funds for PSE. Spending title I money on PSE increased over time. At the end of December 1974, only three prime sponsorships used title I money for PSE. By the end of December 1975, this number had increased to 7, and, as indicated, by the end of March 1976, 3 more had joined the ranks to make 10 prime sponsors using title I money in this way. The amount of

[1]For some of the debate among economists, see "Proceedings of a Conference on Public Service Employment" (Washington: National Commission for Manpower Policy, 1975).

spending also increased. And once title I money spending on PSE begins, it tends to continue. In only one case in Ohio did a prime sponsor spend money in this way early in its existence and then stop.

The percent of title I participants in PSE slots is also relatively low in those areas spending title I money on PSE although, in the case of the largest spender, 22 percent of all title I participants are in PSE slots.

There are several plausible explanations for the growth of title I PSE. One is the economy: As unemployment increases the thrust of CETA efforts may be toward cyclical problems rather than toward structural problems; and as prime sponsorships face local fiscal problems they may be tempted to use PSE from title I as an additional buffer against long-term layoffs and/or cuts in existing public services.

The relationship between the change in unemployment rates and changing patterns of title I PSE spending was studied. In three cases the predicted relationship was found. In a number of cases there was no discernible relationship, although in no cases was there a relationship in the opposite direction from that predicted. Only weak evidence emerged, therefore, of a direct relationship between unemployment and title I PSE spending. Although it is likely that the relationship exists, it is probably a complicated one.

An examination of the attitudes of important actors in those prime sponsorships with title I PSE spending showed that in some cases spending occurred even where staff members professed not to believe in it. In only four prime sponsorships did any political officials list PSE as their most preferred use of title I money; three in fact used title I money in that way. But this is hardly overwhelming evidence of a direct and clear link between preferences and reality. Very few actors in any category anywhere in the State listed PSE as their most preferred way of spending title I money, and many listed it as their least preferred way. Perhaps significantly, the percentage of political officials listing it as least preferred was usually smaller than that of staff members and MPC members.

Using PSE to Rehire Public Employees

A nationwide controversy has developed over the use of PSE money from all three titles to rehire regular city or county workers who have been laid off. Latest regulations still allow this practice but have limited it. The issue is not simple and involves such questions as how a prime sponsor can demonstrate a bona fide fiscal problem and how to reconcile CETA policies with union agreements.

Eleven of [illegible] Ohio prime sponsorships had some cut in their [illegible] county budgets. Of those 11, 8 were forced to [illegible] offs. Of the 8, 6 used CETA money to rehire [illegible] some of those laid off, although the percentage [illegible] and the amount spent varied considerably (ran [illegible] as reduced below prime sponsor wishes by Departm[illegible] of Labor action in two cases). Two of the area[illegible] title I money in addition to titles II and VI funds for the purpose of rehiring laid-off workers (but Labor Department action cut the planned use of such money dramatically in one of these cases). These data suggest a very strong relationship between city and county budget problems and the decision to use CETA money for rehiring. The question remains, of course, as to how many layoffs would have taken place if CETA money had not been available to mitigate some of the results.

Transition to Unsubsidized Employment

One of CETA's national goals is to use PSE money to increase the number of participants who successfully make the transition to unsubsidized employment. It is also a goal almost universally voiced in Ohio prime sponsorships by staff members and political officials. (Interestingly, it is much less vital to members of MPC's, many of whom labeled it a "not very important" goal.) Performance in achieving the goal, however, has varied enormously.

To determine the relative success of Ohio prime sponsors in helping PSE participants make the transition to unsubsidized employment, the project examined "indirect placements" (those made after the individual had received CETA employment or training) as a percentage of the total number of individuals entering employment after having been served by title II or VI (virtually all in PSE slots). Given the low numbers involved, however, a minor change in numbers caused the percentages to fluctuate wildly. Consequently, indirect placements from titles II and VI as a percentage of those entering employment plus all other positive terminations were studied. Although the percentages are lower than in the first measure, they are probably more meaningful.

As of March 31, 1976, the percentages derived from this measure of transition varied from 0 to 80 percent for title II (with an average of 18 percent) and from 0 to 89 percent (with an average of 34 percent) for title VI. Only 3 of the 17 Ohio prime sponsorships were equaling or bettering the formal national goal of 50 percent transition to permanent unsubsidized employment (although it is unclear to what that 50 percent refers in terms of appropriate calculations). For title VI, only two prime sponsorships were equalling or exceeding 50 percent.

Table 17 summarizes the spread of transition success in all 17 cases for both titles. The column for title II suggests very low success in transition to permanence. Title VI column shows considerably more success, although 7 of the 17 are still below even the relatively modest figure of 30 percent.

Little relationship was found between unemployment rates and transition rates. Some prime sponsorships with relatively high unemployment rates were doing quite well in promoting transition. Others with relatively low rates were doing very poorly.

The wide variation in success rates plus the seemingly nondeterministic effect of unemployment suggest two possible conclusions: A hopeful conclusion is that prime sponsors who want a high rate of transition to permanent employment can probably achieve it by concentrated and consistent effort. The less hopeful conclusion is that it is also easy for any prime sponsor to give verbal support to transition to permanence but to perform very badly in achieving it. Unfortunately, that seems the more normal choice at present.

One additional piece of information suggests that, as a prime sponsor's focus on PSE increases, the focus on permanence as a meaningful goal will diminish. Of the seven prime sponsorships spending more than 6 percent of their title I funds on PSE (implying that voluntarily using title I money for PSE demonstrates a commitment to PSE beyond the easier practice of using all of titles II and VI money for PSE where the national guidance suggested that was "normal"), five performed well below average in transition to permanence for both titles II and VI.

TABLE 17. TRANSITION TO PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT FROM TITLES II AND VI, MARCH 31, 1976, OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS

Participants making transition (percent)	Number of prime sponsorships	
	Title II	Title VI
80-89	1	1
70-79	0	0
60-69	0	1
50-59	2	0
40-49	0	3
30-39	1	5
20-29	0	3
10-19	4	3
0-9	9	1
Average or mean (percent)	18	34

PSE and Career Growth

Transition to permanent unsubsidized employment is, of course, the most important aspect of career growth in PSE jobs. But PSE jobs can have a training component that will provide skills and/or attitudes that will broaden career opportunities and provide subsequent advancement to more satisfying and higher paying jobs.

There are several ways to investigate whether prime sponsors are attempting to provide a career growth or training component in their PSE slots. One measure is to look at the amount of presumptive PSE money (titles II and VI) that is, in fact, spent in categories other than PSE. If a prime sponsor is convinced that the training or career growth component of PSE slots is not sufficient, it may elect to spend the money on other programs. In Ohio, only four prime sponsors spent any of their titles II and VI money for non-PSE purposes as of March 31, 1976. One of them spent a substantial amount (44 percent) and the other three much less (9, 4, and 1 percent). Earlier in CETA, three other prime sponsors had spent titles II and VI money for non-PSE purposes (even as late as June 30, 1975) but they all stopped the practice.

A more direct measurement of the importance of a career growth component to PSE jobs is the prime sponsor spending of titles II and VI money on training for PSE participants. Here, the record in Ohio suggests that virtually no money is spent in this way. Only two prime sponsors were using any of their title II money—1 and 2 percent—in this way as of March 31, 1976. Eight were using tiny amounts of title VI funds—one about 1 percent and the other seven less than 0.5 percent for training.

What explains this minimal commitment to providing career growth (except by chance) in PSE jobs? (In theory, title II was specifically constructed to help the disadvantaged be served by another form of manpower program stressing career growth, although the distinction between title II and VI purposes has long been forgotten by most CETA actors.)

A fair number of manpower actors throughout Ohio, when asked, labeled career growth as "not very important" as a goal for PSE. They were still outnumbered in most cases by those labeling it a "very important" goal. On the other hand, very few actors labeled it "the most important goal" for PSE. This may be another situation in which verbal support for a goal does not imply real support or in which support is voiced in an interview situation for form's sake.

More revealing data are provided by detailed interviewing of staff members throughout Ohio on the genuine feasibility of providing career growth through PSE. Most staff members felt that career growth was the sole responsibility of the agency with the PSE slot rather than the responsibility of the prime sponsorship staff. A number of others said it simply was not possible to as-

sume this responsibility under present conditions. One said career growth was important but admitted he had no idea how to implement it. Only in two cases did staff members talk pointedly about its desirability and feasibility and techniques for achieving it (and these were the only two prime sponsorships in which a little title II money was being used for training). The central reason for almost universally ignoring career growth in PSE is that staff members give it no meaningful priority, often simply because they do not believe it is one of their responsibilities.

PSE Target Groups

As indicated before, the practical or programmatic utility of significant segment data is doubtful. An inspection of the significant segments named in title II and title VI plans, however, indicates that there is some difference between how manpower actors think about the two titles (this may be the last distinction left between the two titles in the minds of most actors). Title II significant segments focus on demographic categories (age, race, and sex) that imply long-term disadvantage in the labor market. Title VI significant segments focus on employment status, which in many cases may be only a shortrun disadvantage in the labor market.

Distribution of PSE Jobs

The distribution of PSE jobs among employing agencies is often a major decision in many prime sponsorships. There are generally three[2] broad types of employing agencies: private, nonprofit agencies (nongovernmental); units of the prime sponsor's governmental structure (city or county or consortium agencies); and other public agencies (State, local, or Federal government units; boards of education; and so on).

In fiscal 1976, the average distribution of title II jobs was 60 percent to prime sponsor agencies, 35 percent to other governmental agencies, and 5 percent to private nonprofit agencies. The distribution of title VI jobs was very similar: 58 percent to prime sponsor agencies, 31 percent to other governmental agencies, and 11 percent to private, nonprofit agencies. But, as with so many features of CETA, these averages cover a broad range. Some prime sponsors used virtually all of their title II and VI slots for prime sponsor agencies. At the other extreme, some used as low as about a quarter of their PSE slots for prime sponsor agencies. In a few cases the allocation of PSE slots was more than 25 percent to private, nonprofit agencies. In many cases (especially in title II), the allocation to private agencies was either nonexistent or very small.

There are several possible explanations of why some prime sponsorships concentrate their title II and VI resources on slots for their own governmental agencies. One explanation may simply be that given short lead times for planning and strong pressure from DOL to spend money and fill slots, a heavy emphasis on the agencies nearest at hand and easiest to communicate with naturally emerged.

But three other factors explain variations: (1) The fiscal condition of the prime sponsorship (measured by the existence of layoffs in the regular city or county work force); (2) the preferences of political officials when asked how they would ideally distribute PSE among the three types of employing agencies (measured by responses to a closed-ended interview question); and (3) the involvement of political officials in distributing PSE jobs (measured by responses to a closed-ended interview question asked of all actors).

When these factors are looked at in connection with the percentage of jobs in the regular governmental agencies of the prime sponsorship some striking patterns emerge.

1. In only two cases in which a prime sponsorship had local layoffs did the percentage of jobs used for prime sponsor agencies fall below the average. In five other cases it was above average.

2. In six cases, where at least half of the political officials preferred in an "ideal" sense that at least half of the PSE jobs go to prime sponsor agencies, the distribution of jobs to such agencies was, in fact, above average. There was only one case in which the preferences and reality did not coincide.

3. In six cases in which political officials were perceived to be very influential in the distribution of PSE jobs, an above average percentage of those jobs went to prime sponsor agencies. Conversely, three prime sponsorships in which political officials were perceived to be very influential allocated less than an average percentage of the jobs to prime sponsor agencies.

TABLE 18. RELATION BETWEEN EXPLANATORY FACTORS AND ALLOCATION OF PSE JOBS TO PRIME SPONSOR AGENCIES

Percentage allocation of public service employment jobs to prime sponsor agencies	Explanatory factors present	
	2 or 3	0 or 1
Above average	7	2
Below average	2	5

Note: Columns 2 and 3 contain number of prime sponsorships.

[2]The following analysis omits balance of State.

4. When all three factors are considered simultaneously, their explanatory power increases. Both prime sponsorships in which all three factors were present were above average in their allocation of PSE jobs to prime sponsor agencies. Of the seven additional prime sponsorships in which at least two of the factors were present, five had allocated a higher than average percentage of PSE jobs to prime sponsor agencies. Only two prime sponsorships with less than two of the factors present allocated a larger than average percentage of PSE jobs to prime sponsor agencies. Five prime sponsorships with none or only one of the factors present were below average in their allocations to prime sponsors. Table 18 summarizes these relationships in a simple matrix.

VI. PARTICIPANTS IN CETA PROGRAMS

Throughout the course of the project the changing characteristics of participants in CETA programs both in Ohio prime sponsorships and nationally have been monitored. Described first in this chapter are titles I, II, and VI enrollees based on aggregate data from the Quarterly Summaries of Participant Characteristics reported by the prime sponsors and the national data provided by the Department of Labor on age, education, race, economic status, and sex. For titles I and II change was compared between December 31, 1974 (when the first relatively good data were available), and June 30, 1975 (the end of the first full year of CETA), and March 31, 1976 (the date of the most recent complete data available). For title VI, change was compared between March 31, 1975 (the first data available for title VI), and March 31, 1976 (the latest data available). The data for intervening quarters for all titles were also checked to make sure that the statements about trends were accurate.

A description of the participants for each of the three titles is followed by some general observations and comparisons of the experience in the various titles. Explanations for the patterns described are then made.

Title I Participants

At the aggregate level, on all characteristics, change both nationally and in Ohio was relatively clear and in the same direction in each case. Table 19 summarizes aggregate figures. That table (plus data for intervening quarters) supports the following general statements about trends in the changing characteristics of title I participants:

1. Both nationally and in Ohio, participants are becoming older.

2. Both nationally and in Ohio, participants are becoming better educated.

3. Nationally, the percentage of black participants dropped slightly over the 15-month period. In Ohio, the decrease in percentage of black participants has been larger and more constant.

4. Both nationally and in Ohio, the participants are becoming less economically disadvantaged, although nationally the major drop occurred between December 31, 1974 and March 31, 1975. The decline has been both larger and steadier in Ohio.

5. Both nationally and in Ohio, the proportion of female participants is declining, although the national decline has seemed to level off.

When the Ohio prime sponsorships are disaggregated, the aggregate trends are strongly supported for all participants' characteristics for analyses of change from the second to the third quarter of fiscal 1975 and from the fourth quarter of fiscal 1975 to the third quarter of 1976.

Tables 20 and 21 report on the direction of change in title I participants in the 14 Ohio prime sponsorships that

TABLE 19. AGGREGATE PERCENT CHANGE IN TITLE I PARTICIPANTS, DECEMBER 31, 1974, JUNE 30, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976

Characteristic	U.S. participants			Ohio participants		
	Dec. 31, 1974	June 30, 1975	Mar. 31, 1976	Dec. 31, 1974	June 30, 1975	Dec. 31, 1976
Under 22 years of age	65	62	57	68	61	53
12 or more years of education	33	39	45	34	38	48
Black	40	37	37	56	52	48
Economically disadvantaged	81	78	76	84	82	71
Female	49	45	46	47	44	42

TABLE 20. CHANGES IN TITLE I PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN INDIVIDUAL OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS, DECEMBER 31, 1974, AND MARCH 31, 1976

[Number of prime sponsorships]

Report of prime sponsorships	Change in percent who are—				
	Under 22 years of age	Persons with 12 or more years of education	Black	Economically disadvantaged	Female
Significant decreases	10	3	11	8	9
Significant increases	3	11	3	6	4
No change	1	0	0	0	1

TABLE 21. CHANGES IN TITLE I PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN INDIVIDUAL OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS, JUNE 30, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976

[Number of prime sponsorships]

Report of prime sponsorships	Change in percent who are—				
	Under 22 years of age	Persons with 12 or more years of education	Black	Economically disadvantaged	Female
Decreases	11	3	8	10	8
Increases	3	11	5	3	5
No change	0	0	1	1	1

existed in both years. These tables support several conclusions:

1. On all five characteristics, more Ohio prime sponsorships exhibited change in the direction predicted by national and State aggregate experience than did not.

2. The trends toward older, better educated, and fewer black and economically disadvantaged participants, however, were somewhat stronger than the trend toward fewer women.

In all cases, one to six prime sponsors reported trends that went counter to the expectations stemming from the aggregate figures. This suggests that individual prime sponsorships still retain leverage over the nature of the clients they serve. The local pressures that produce the statewide trends are strong, but they are not absolutely controlling. The relatively high degree of local autonomy granted by CETA can be used to produce different mixes of clients—a point that is taken up later.

Title II Participants

At the aggregate level, there was more stability evident in the nature of title II than title I participants, both nationally and in Ohio. In only two instances did the aggregate Ohio experience differ from the aggregate national experience. Table 22 summarizes the aggregate figures. That table (plus inspection of data for intervening quarters) supports the following general statements about title II participants:

1. The age distribution both nationally and in Ohio has remained stable.

2. Both nationally and in Ohio, the participants are becoming better educated.

3. Nationally, the proportion of black participants has remained stable. In Ohio, that proportion has steadily declined, although it is still above the national average.

TABLE 22. AGGREGATE PERCENT CHANGE IN TITLE II PARTICIPANTS, DECEMBER 31, 1974, JUNE 30, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976

Characteristic	U.S. participants			Ohio participants		
	Dec. 31, 1974	June 30, 1975	March 31, 1976	Dec. 31, 1974	June 30, 1975	March 31, 1976
22 to 44 years of age	62	63	64	64	62	66
12 or more years of education	71	75	75	67	72	74
Black	24	23	25	47	40	35
Economically disadvantaged	48	45	45	36	43	40
Female	35	35	37	27	33	31

4. The proportion of economically disadvantaged declined slightly on the national level. In Ohio, the percentage of economically disadvantaged has increased and declined and increased again slightly. The Ohio percentage has been consistently lower than the national percentage, however.

5. Both nationally and in Ohio, the proportion of female participants has remained stable or increased slightly over time.

Tables 23 and 24 report on the direction of change in title II participants in the 13 prime sponsors that existed in both fiscal years 1975 and 1976 (1 of the total of 14

TABLE 23. CHANGES IN TITLE II PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN INDIVIDUAL OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS, DECEMBER 31, 1974, AND MARCH 31, 1976

[Number of prime sponsorships]

Report of prime sponsorships	Change in percent who are—				
	22 to 44 years of age	Persons with 12 or more years of education	Black	Economically disadvantaged	Female
Decreases	8	6	9	7	6
Increases	5	6	3	5	7
No change	0	1	1	1	0

TABLE 24. CHANGES IN TITLE II PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN INDIVIDUAL OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS, JUNE 30, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976[1]

[Number of prime sponsorships]

Report of prime sponsorships	Change in percent who are—				
	22 to 44 years of age	Persons with 12 or more years of education	Black	Economically disadvantaged	Female
Decreases	4	1	10	8	5
Increases	7	11	2	4	8
No change	2	1	1	1	0

[1]Data were missing for one prime sponsorship.

was not eligible for title II in 1975). The disaggregated analysis supports the aggregate trends for changes in education and race. Somewhat more mixed patterns are evident for age and female characteristics. The disaggregated data suggest declining service to the most disadvantaged, a partial contradiction of the aggregate analysis.

Title VI Participants

At the aggregate level, there was a great deal of stability both nationally and in Ohio in terms of the characteristics of title VI participants in the period from March 31, 1975 through March 31, 1976. Table 25 summarizes the aggregate data for this period. The table also suggests that Ohio title VI participants are like participants throughout the nation, except for being somewhat less economically disadvantaged.

TABLE 25. AGGREGATE PERCENT CHANGE IN TITLE VI PARTICIPANTS, MARCH 31, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976

Characteristic	U.S. participants		Ohio participants	
	Mar. 31, 1975	Mar. 31, 1976	Mar. 31, 1975	Mar. 31, 1976
22 to 44 years of age	66	65	64	64
12 or more years of education	74	77	77	77
Black	23	23	27	25
Economically disadvantaged	44	44	40	39
Female	29	35	35	34

Analysis of the Ohio cases on a disaggregated basis (reported in table 26) also supports the general finding that there seem to be no strong trends in terms of changing characteristics of title VI participants.

Comparisons of Titles

Table 27 focuses on the participants in Ohio prime sponsorships as of March 31, 1976, in three separate ways. First, the figures for each of the titles on education, race, economic status, sex, and age are repeated together so that the nature of the participants in the three titles can be easily compared. Second, a word comparison is made of that figure with the national figure in each case. Third, a word summary is given of the changes that occurred over time for each of the characteristics. This three-dimensional summary reports the following generalizations and speculations:

1. Title I participants are very different from those in title II and title VI. They are much less formally educated, much more likely to be black, economically disadvantaged, female, and young.

2. Over time, the title II clients who used to occupy a middle position between the three titles in terms of characteristics have moved to resemble the title VI clients much more closely.

3. Except for race, titles II and VI participants closely resemble each other. Title II clients are much more likely to be black than title VI clients. The similarity in percentage of economically disadvantaged and in percentage of individuals with at least a high school education strongly suggests that Ohio prime sponsors are, by and large, treating titles II and VI as having the same goals in terms of clients. In fact, however, the statute intends title II to be aimed more at the disadvantaged and title VI to be more explicitly countercyclical. The evidence is

TABLE 26. CHANGES IN TITLE VI PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN INDIVIDUAL OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS, JUNE 30, 1975, AND MARCH 31, 1976

[Number of prime sponsorships]

Report of prime sponsorships	Change in percent who are—				
	22 to 44 years of age	Persons with 12 or more years of education	Black	Economically disadvantaged	Female
Decreases	7	7	7	8	7
Increases	6	4	5	5	5
No change	0	2	1	0	1

54

TABLE 27. A SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS IN OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS, MARCH 31, 1976

Characteristic	Title I			Title II			Title VI		
	On Mar. 31, 1976 (percent)	Comparison with national average	Trend	On Mar. 31, 1976 (percent)	Comparison with national average	Trend	On Mar. 31, 1976 (percent)	Comparison with national average	Trend
12 or more years of education	48	Better educated	More education	74	Slightly less educated	More education	77	Same	Stable
Black	48	More blacks	Fewer blacks	35	More blacks	Fewer blacks	25	Slightly more blacks	Slightly fewer blacks
Economically disadvantaged	71	Less disadvantaged	Less disadvantaged	40	Less disadvantaged	Erratic and mixed	39	Less disadvantaged	Stable
Female	42	Fewer female	Fewer female	31	Fewer female	More female	34	Slightly fewer female	Slightly fewer female
Under 22 years of age (I)	53	Older	Older						
22 to 44 years of age (II and VI)				66	Older	Older	64	Slightly younger	Stable

that Ohio prime sponsors do not systematically make this distinction.

4. While it may be too early to tell, there seems to have been a stabilization of service to the economically disadvantaged in titles II and VI (particularly the latter) at levels well below the title I levels. On the other hand, the service to the economically disadvantaged in title I continues to decline at a steady pace: the national average has declined by 5 percent, but Ohio prime sponsors were serving 13 percent less economically disadvantaged by March 31, 1976 than they were in December of 1974.

5. The overall trend in titles I and II is toward serving the better educated participant: Titles II and VI have already reached very high levels and the title I service patterns have demonstrated an increase of 14 percent in service to those with a high school degree or beyond. Ohio prime sponsors have emphasized and are continuing to emphasize the less well-educated participant.

6. The trend in service to blacks under all three titles is toward serving fewer participants: Title I declined by 8 percent, title II by 8 percent, and title VI by 2 percent. In all three titles, however, Ohio prime sponsors still serve a higher than national average percentage of black participants, even though the black percentage of the Ohio population is close to the national average.

7. It is worth reiterating that in all cases aggregate analysis obscures important individual differences. Prime sponsors do retain latitude to make choices about the mix of participants and some use that latitude to move in directions different from the aggregate trends.

Participant Service Patterns

This section attempts to account for variations in participant service patterns among prime sponsors, the differences between title I and PSE programs, and the changes in characteristics. Focus is on the levels of service and changes to the economically disadvantaged and blacks. These characteristics were chosen because it was argued, before the passage of CETA, that these two groups would suffer most in loss of services if manpower programs were decentralized and decategorized.[1] In fact, the descriptive material thus far presented shows a large decrease in service to these groups in title I and stabilization at relatively low levels of service in titles II and VI.

In attempting to explain these results we will investigate four different sets of factors: (1) local economic conditions; (2) relevant attitudes of influential local actors; (3) the impact of national policy and regional office activities; and (4) local programmatic decisions.

Local Economic Conditions

Economic conditions in prime sponsorships exert both indirect and direct influences on CETA participant service patterns.

[1]See, for example, G. Mangum and D. Snedeker, *Manpower Planning for Local Labor Markets* (Salt Lake City: Olympus, 1974), p. 309.

An alteration in the pool of potential CETA applicants represents one direct impact that economic conditions can produce. The correspondence between that pool and CETA service patterns was measured in several ways.

1970 Census Data. First, service patterns as of March 31, 1976, were compared with 1970 census data. Although the 1970 data are old, they offer a rough starting point. The percent of unemployed who were black and the percent economically disadvantaged as reported by the census were considered. Without exception (although census data were unavailable on a few prime sponsorships), service in all three titles to clients at least equals the relevant proportions in the population. And in most cases it considerably exceeds those proportions. Variations in service, however, are not determined by variations in the basic makeup of the population. Prime sponsorships with very similar percentages of economically disadvantaged persons or very similar percentages of blacks among the unemployed may vary a great deal in the service they offer these groups. Basic demographic composition may put some outer limits on variations in participant patterns but clearly it does not determine them. There is latitude for deliberately planned variation.

Active Files. More current "universe of need" data than that provided by the census are necessary to investigate further the impact of economic conditions on participant service patterns. To explore this relationship more fully data collected by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services was used. These data are derived from local office active files. The active file includes CETA eligibles such as the unemployed, the underemployed, and the economically disadvantaged. Also included in the active file, however, is a small percentage of employed individuals who are seeking new employment. It is difficult to gage the size of this group, but the best estimate is probably 10 percent or less. In addition, it is reasonable to expect the proportion to be reduced during a recessionary period. The inclusion of this group in the active file results in overstatement of the incidence of need.

On the other hand, need may also be understated by the exclusion of those who have given up their search for employment. During economic downturns, the proportion of such individuals ("discouraged workers") increases and probably more than offsets the "added worker" effect. (The added worker effect refers to the increased labor force participation rate during times of rising unemployment. As the normal breadwinner for a family loses his or her job, additional family members may seek employment.) Need may also be understated in the failure of some to register with the employment service. Blacks and the economically disadvantaged may be particularly reluctant to register with the ES for a number of reasons, although there is no hard evidence on this question.

ES Data. Finally, the matching of prime sponsorships and ES area offices is an approximation. The data are by place of registration, not place of residence. And some individuals may register at more than one ES office. Despite these limitations, the ES data represent an accessible and current surrogate measure of need within a prime sponsorship.

A comparison of service patterns with these data reveals that the percentage of blacks virtually always equals, and in most cases exceeds, the proportion of economically disadvantaged in the ES active file for most prime sponsors (although the prime sponsor data on economic status is probably a good deal more subject to error than the data on race). But by a ratio of about two cases to one, prime sponsors serve a smaller percentage of disadvantaged with titles II and VI than are in the active file.

Overall, Ohio prime sponsors serve 48 percent blacks in title I, 35 percent in title II, and 25 percent in title VI. This compares to an average of 24 percent blacks in the ES active file in all prime sponsorships.

The economically disadvantaged make up 45 percent of the active file. Ohio prime sponsors report serving 71 percent economically disadvantaged with title I, 40 percent with title II, and 39 percent with title VI.

These data, coupled with an inspection of wide variations in individual cases, again suggest that the "universe of need" does not control the choices prime sponsors make about who will get served. Prime sponsors have wide latitude in determining patterns of participation to be served. The data also underscore an earlier observation about the stabilization of service to the disadvantaged with titles II and VI at a relatively low level.

Rates Changes, 1974-76. The relationship among changes in clients, ES registrants, and unemployment rates between December 31, 1974 and March 31, 1976, was assessed. During this period, the unemployment rate statewide increased about 68 percent, the percent of the ES active file cases who were black decreased about 4 percent (reflecting a large influx of new white registrants, many of whom were newly unemployed), and the percent of the ES active file cases who were economically disadvantaged remained about stable. In the same period the percent of blacks served declined by 8 percent in title I, 12 percent in title II, and 2 percent in title VI. The percent of economically disadvantaged served declined by 13 percent in title I, increased by 4 percent in title II, and decreased by 1 percent in title VI.

Although the changing nature of the potential pool of CETA applicants was related to changes in clients, it in no way determined these changes. (This conclusion is reinforced when the individual prime sponsorships are inspected separately.) The potential pool of blacks declined, but service to blacks declined far more. Likewise, although the percentage of economically disadvantaged in the ES active file remained stable, service to economically disadvantaged went down dramatically in the case

of title I, while increasing slightly for title II and decreasing very slightly for title VI.

In general, it was found that as unemployment increases, the percent of blacks and economically disadvantaged served goes down. For example, when the percent unemployed in the third quarter of fiscal 1975 were correlated with the percent black and disadvantaged served in the fourth quarter, negative correlations of 0.36 for blacks and 0.25 for economically disadvantaged resulted.

Supplemental Data. To supplement the analysis of demographic and unemployment data, a systematic collection of the perceptions of service deliverers and prime sponsor staff members in relation to the changing nature of CETA applications and intake was made. Of 55 title I service deliverers throughout the State who take in clients, 44 percent indicated that they thought a higher proportion of whites applied for CETA programs in times of rising unemployment, 33 percent said they thought more blacks applied, 13 percent perceived no difference, and 10 percent had no opinion. Twenty-three percent of the same individuals indicated that they saw an increase in the proportion of disadvantaged persons applying for CETA programs in times of rising unemployment whereas 65 percent indicated they saw an increase in the proportion of nondisadvantaged persons applying. Eight percent saw no change and 5 percent had no opinion.

Staff representatives from each prime sponsorship were questioned about their perceptions of the same kinds of changes. About one-quarter saw no change, but about half saw change in the direction of more whites and fewer disadvantaged in the pool of CETA applicants.

These perceptions, when matched with the ES active file data, are partially correct (in the case of blacks) but also incorrect (in the case of the economically disadvantaged). Whether accurate or not, however, these perceptions help determine the kinds of decisions that will be made by manpower actors like professional staff members and service deliverers. Thus the decline in service to the disadvantaged can be explained in part on the basis of these perceptions, despite their inaccuracy in relation to the best estimates made of the actual pool of CETA eligibles. (There may be slippage between CETA eligibles and CETA applicants, but there are no good aggregate data on CETA applicants as opposed to actual enrollees.)

One final point about perceptions should be added. Professional staff members were much more inclined to perceive economic conditions as related to their choice of titles II and VI participants than to their choice of title I participants. Only 10 percent of those interviewed said that economic conditions were a reason for their title I participant preferences, but 82 percent said that economic conditions helped explain their titles II and VI preferences. This link, when coupled to the nature of their preceptions of the pool of eligibles and applicants underscores the importance of perceptions and the latitude possessed by prime sponsors.

Attitudes of Influential Actors

The general impact of the perceptions of economic conditions on the part of prime sponsor staff and service deliverers on participant service patterns has been discussed. More direct data were sought on the attitudes of all manpower actors about preferred client service patterns in systematic interviews in the spring of 1976. Table 28 summarizes these attitudes in the percent of manpower actors in the State wanting to serve 50 percent or

TABLE 28. ATTITUDES CONCERNING PREFERRED CLIENT SERVICE PATTERNS

Title	Staff (N=109)	Service deliverers (N=78)	Political officials (N=37)	Council members (N=174)
	Percent who want at least 50 percent or more economically disadvantaged			
Title I	86	81	70	75
Title II	71	71	65	64
Title VI	64	64	62	64
	Percent who want at least 50 percent or more blacks			
Title I	57	55	24	65
Title II	47	57	36	59
Title VI	45	50	27	59

more economically disadvantaged (by title) and the percent wanting to serve 50 percent or more black (by title).

The table indicates that a higher percentage of all actors opt for a client population composed of over 50 percent economically disadvantaged than a client population of over 50 percent blacks. The differences apparent across actors are interesting, especially with regard to the question of service to blacks. Thirty percent of the political officials interviewed refused to voice their preferences on this question; only 8 percent refused to venture an opinion concerning their preferences on economically disadvantaged. Of those political officials who did state an opinion, a much smaller percentage than other actors wished to serve 50 percent or more blacks. For title I the relevant figures are 24 percent for political officials, 55 percent for service deliverers, 57 percent for staff, and 65 percent for council members.

Caution is indicated in the interpretation of these findings because a variety of factors could have influenced the results obtained. It is possible that political officials, more than other groups, were aware of local population composition of the prime sponsorship. In addition, the aggregation of groups across all prime sponsors ascribes homogeneity that is not present.

To weight the opinions of different actors—especially staff and political officials—the models of title I influence developed earlier in this report were linked to outcomes in terms of participant service patterns. A ratio of blacks served by prime sponsorship to blacks in the ES active file and a ratio of economically disadvantaged served to economically disadvantaged in the ES active files were used as measures of relative performance (given the limitations of the ES data discussed earlier only 11 cases were analyzed). When these performance measures were rank ordered and then cross-tabulated with the overall judgment previously reported about influence over title I decisions, some hints of a relationship were found. Specifically, the two cases of the 11 in which the staff was dominant by itself were also the two cases in which the highest ratios of both blacks and economically disadvantaged were being served by title I. This makes sense, given the data on preferences reported in table 27. Likewise, in two of the three cases in which the staff shared influence only with political officials the performance was very low (10th and 11th of the 11 in the case of blacks and 9th and 11th in the case of economically disadvantaged). This is also in accord with the preferences reported in table 27. Although these data are rough as yet, they indicate that in fact preferences and influence patterns explain a good deal of why different mixes of clients get service in different prime sponsorships.

National Policy and Regional Office Activities

The statute set eligibility requirements for title I that broadened the potential pool of individuals who might seek manpower services. The categorical programs were more closely tied to the most disadvantaged in the population. The CETA title allocation formula also created a flow of manpower dollars to more suburban (usually predominantly white) areas away from central cities (with much larger black populations).[2] Title II also had reasonably broad eligibility requirements and with the coming of title VI (and the close linking of titles II and VI in most actors' minds) PSE focused on the recently unemployed person who tended to be less disadvantaged in other ways.

Thus the trend away from service to the disadvantaged and, to some extent, the trend away from service to blacks was dictated by Congress in the statute. (Proponents of these changes, of course, argue that there is nothing unfair about them but that, in fact, CETA represents a fairer distribution of resources among that part of the population genuinely in need of manpower services.)

In a number of ways it seemed that regional office policy in the case of Ohio also reinforced the trend toward relatively less service for the most disadvantaged. The regional office took only minimal steps to monitor the eligibility of enrollees in prime sponsorships. There was evidently no attempt in the region to determine whether client service patterns corresponded to the actual nature and incidence of need. In addition, the emphasis on making program data conform to plan data has often led prime sponsors to substitute client outcomes from previous quarters in their planning documents for plans based on an analysis of need.

The stress from the regional office on spending at the planned rate, especially for PSE and especially in 1975, also led to diminished service to the most disadvantaged. It is much easier to locate and enroll the relatively less disadvantaged and especially the recently unemployed who may be quite middle class in all other ways. In effect, the regional office encouraged prime sponsors to commit greater funds to programs that could be implemented quickly with high per enrollee costs (thus eating up the money rapidly). The result was to reduce services for the less job-ready participants, who also tend to be the most economically disadvantaged.

Programmatic Decisions

Decisions about the type of programs offered and the choice of deliverers (already discussed in some detail) have direct impact on the type of participants enrolled. For example, Perry and others[3] report that minorities have traditionally been enrolled in work-experience programs. One might also speculate that the most economi-

[2] On these points, see W. Mirengoff and L. Rindler, *The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act* (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1976).

[3] C.R. Perry and others, *The Impact of Government Manpower Programs* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975).

cally disadvantaged have also tended to cluster in work-experience programs. Thus, those prime sponsorships that stress work experience may also, in effect, be deciding simultaneously to serve a higher proportion of blacks and economically disadvantaged. On the other hand, those prime sponsorships that stress PSE are probably at the same time building in a relatively lower stress on minorities and the economically disadvantaged. Percent expenditures on PSE and percent disadvantaged served as of June 30, 1975 were correlated, and a strong negative relationship (a correlation of -0.59 was found. A strong positive relationship (0.60) was found between percent of expenditures on work experience and percent of disadvantaged served.

The selection of service deliverers often has a direct impact on what participants are selected and served because of factors such as the physical location of specific deliverers (deliverers located in a black ghetto are most likely to serve blacks; deliverers located on a suburban beltway, miles from the central city and requiring a car to get there, are much less likely to serve blacks and economically disadvantaged, and so on), and the history of service to particular groups that often was well-developed before CETA even began. (The most explicit recognition of impact of different histories came when one chief staff member deliberately chose two OJT deliverers—the Employment Service to work in white areas and the Urban League to work in black areas. He wanted to serve both races well and realized that choosing only one deliverer would effectively eliminate most service to one race or the other.)

Summary

The findings and conclusions on the explanations for different participant service patterns discussed in the preceding pages are worth underscoring:

1. The attitudes of the manpower actors in the jurisdictions are important. Both the policymakers (staff and political officials) who set the planning levels and quotas and those who actually admit people to the programs (service deliverers) play critical roles in determining service levels. But the attitudes of manpower actors do not wholly account for the observed outcomes.

2. An element that may be indirectly related to the attitudes of manpower actors is the nature of programs selected and the types of agencies receiving contracts for CETA programs. These choices limit the kinds of people who qualify for enrollment and help explain the nature of people who seek CETA services. Programmatic choices inevitably favor one group of clients over another.

3. A third crucial factor seems to be simply the types of programs that operated in the past and the nature of areas that received services under pre-CETA programs. Manpower professionals have the tools and authority, however, to alter the mix of participants if they so desire. Some Ohio professional staff members in fact produced outcomes that ran counter to trends.

4. Local economic conditions had a direct impact. According to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services indicators, the need for service to blacks decreased along with the decline in service to blacks by the prime sponsors. The decrease in service, however, was greater than the actual decline in need. The need for economically disadvantaged enrollees remained stable, while the actual service to this group declined substantially in title I and remained below need levels for titles II and VI.

5. The changing economic conditions altered substantially the characteristics of those who sought out CETA-intake offices. By the end of the period under study, the overall nature of that pool had shifted towards the relatively more advantaged individual.

6. Worsening economic conditions had an indirect effect, causing staff and political officials to stress more the recently unemployed worker. A reversal of the process may occur as economic conditions improve, but the slight drop in unemployment rates in Ohio has not thus far been accompanied by shifts in actual service patterns in the prime sponsorships.

7. Finally, national policy and regional Department of Labor policy and actions accentuated trends toward diminishing service to economically disadvantaged and black participants.

VII. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

A Prime Sponsor

By definition, a balance-of-State (BOS) prime sponsorship is quite different from other prime sponsorships. In Ohio, BOS has been composed of the remaining counties not populous enough to be prime sponsors on their own or not contiguous to areas with which they could form consortia, or choosing not to join consortia. In fiscal 1975, BOS contained 64 counties, 3 of which had more than 100,000 people. By fiscal 1976, BOS had 58 counties, only 1 of which had more than 100,000 people. For fiscal 1977, it appears that BOS will shrink to 56 counties, with none over 100,000. A few counties in consortia in fiscal 1975 and 1976 and unhappy with that arrangement for one reason or another investigated the possibility of joining BOS, but no counties have made that decision. Thus BOS in Ohio has always been composed primarily of counties that are rural and small town in character, with no sizeable cities and virtually no suburban areas.

The population of the BOS area is primarily white (over 97 percent). The two largest concentrated groups of CETA eligibles are Appalachians in the southeastern part of the State and a smaller group of Spanish-speaking persons (primarily former migrant farmworkers and their families) in the northwestern part.

In short, BOS planners and decisionmakers are faced with a dispersed population, few existing manpower training facilities, and a CETA-eligible population different in character from that of typical prime sponsorships in the State.

Manpower Actors and Decisionmaking Influence in BOS

There are the usual set of actors both competing and cooperating in the making of CETA decisions in BOS with two additional groups of local councils and local elected officials that have parallels only in some of the larger consortia. The important BOS actors are the Governor and a few close advisers and associates, the professional staff at the State level (and this includes some State area representatives), local elected officials (county commissioners and smalltown mayors), the State Prime Sponsor Council, regional manpower service councils, and service deliverers (primarily the State ES and local community action agencies).

Neither the Governor, theoretically the prime sponsor, nor his immediate staff has been much involved in title I decisions for BOS. Thus, virtually all of the State-level decisionmaking authority, at least for title I, has been vested in the professional staff, who must act largely intuitively regarding gubernatorial priorities for CETA in BOS. The staff is therefore left in a somewhat weak position in situations where there is competition over decisions with other actors.

The State staff was also weakened by an administrative reorganization and very high personnel turnover following a change in Governors (and in party) after the 1974 election. CETA was moved from one cabinet department to another in the spring of 1975, necessitating a number of readjustments. There is considerably more stability now, however, and some developing expertise.

To deal with the various regions in the State, the State staff also inherited a small field representative system of its own. The role of those individuals has never been defined, but some of them—there are eight—have developed expertise and influence at the regional level.

State Prime Sponsor Council. None of the other actors are consistently important, however. The State Prime Sponsor Council (SPSC) is not yet expert and has little influence over BOS decisions. The council in existence in 1974 met seldom and, in effect, was terminated by a partisan turnover in the gubernatorial election of 1974. Its successor council did not meet until 9 months after the election (and over 6 months after the inauguration of the new Governor).

The SPSC has many difficulties to overcome in developing expertise and influence. One is simply the area of the prime sponsorship. Individuals living 200 or 300 miles apart (and 150 miles from the site of meetings) may have trouble in meeting often and, even when they do meet, they certainly cannot share the same sense of community and community problems that MPC members in a single city or county or even a consortium might share. And it is hard to define "representativeness" in an operational way with a council coming from a large territorial area and kept small (12 members) to foster efficiency.

Given the pre-CETA history of ancillary manpower planning boards (AMPB) mandated by law, it seems natural for a BOS prime sponsorship to hand down some decisionmaking authority to the local level. This may be partly from choice and partly a result of local initiative and resistance to centralization. In Ohio, the transference has taken the form of the existence of eight regional manpower services councils (RMSC's)—in effect, a continuation of the AMPB's. They bargain with the State staff for influence over decisions. Within the RMSC's some local elected officials gain some importance (their only other importance seems to be in some PSE decisions) and often, local service deliverers—especially community action agencies—use the RMSC's as their principal vehicle for gaining influence.

Employment Service. The other important service deliverer in the State is the employment service. Its importance derives from its large size, its history of work in manpower, and its position as a State agency with many personal and institutional ties to the Office of Manpower Development and the Department of Administrative Services in which it is located. ES need not compete vigorously to maintain its large delivery role in the BOS prime sponsorship.

The decisionmaking influence pattern in BOS is loose, unstructured, and shifting. At times, it has appeared almost random, with the exception of the constant role of the employment service. Apparently the State professional staff is becoming more consistently important. But that development has been slow, compared with the almost immediate and automatic preeminence of professional staff in title I matters in most other prime sponsorships in the State. Other aspects of influence remain fluid. In a few areas, community action agencies (CAA's) are at odds with local elected officials and are gradually losing influence and delivery roles. In more areas, however, CAA's are well entrenched and have harmonious relations with the local officials and the local RMSC. The status of the RMSC's themselves is ambiguous. Rumors of their impending demise throughout 1975 turned out to be untrue. But as the State staff gains experience and influence, the importance of the RMSC's may continue to diminish.

Another way of summarizing the decisionmaking influence pattern for BOS during the first 2 years of CETA is to say that planning was largely decentralized and administration was largely centralized. (A similar pattern was found in the State of Washington by Rawlins[1]).

Program Choices

Two major program choices have been made for BOS: a substantial portion of the title I allocation (almost one-third) is taken off the top by the State and given to ES (and a few other deliverers) for training programs. The remainder (except for central administrative costs) is allocated to the eight planning regions, largely through the RMSC's (and through negotiations among local elected officials and service deliverers). Most of the money allocated in a decentralized manner goes to work experience (again consistent with the findings of Rawlins[2]), in part because the experienced deliverers from pre-CETA days were almost all in the work-experience area. Some RMSC members felt that, given the statewide ES contract for training, they were required to spend all of their funds on work experience. Although this requirement was not formal and may not have been intended by the State staff, it was nevertheless perceived as a constraint on regional decisionmaking.

Another decision made at the State level that helped shape the regional programmatic decisions was the policy to stress heavily programs of "demonstrated effectiveness." Many RMSC members felt that they were obliged to continue funding existing deliverers (most of which were community action agencies with work-experience programs).

Despite the heavy emphasis on ES and work experience—not necessarily a poor choice for use of BOS title I money—careful analysis of the population being served suggested that there were still more training programs available than might have been expected, given the relative lack of existing training facilities.

Coordinator of Employment and Training Services

According to the statute and some rhetoric about CETA, States are supposed to play an important and active role as statewide coordinators of manpower services. The statute, however, gave the States few resources with which to assume this role. Except for those that are the only prime sponsor, the States have a diversity of programs and priorities. In a populous State like

[1] V.L. Rawlins, "The Role of the State in the CETA Process: A Case Study of Washington State," Report for the Office of Manpower Program Evaluation (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, 1975).

[2] Ibid.

Ohio with many prime sponsorships, the large diversity is attended by considerable built-in local skepticism about any outside influence, whether it be the State or the Department of Labor.

Yet the State is not bereft of resources and potential. States must create a State Manpower Services Council and are given 1 percent of the total allocation for title I programs in all prime sponsorships in the State for funding a staff for the SMSC. They are also given 4 percent of the total allocations for statewide projects of almost any description and 5 percent of the total allocations for statewide projects in vocational education. They can draw on the influence and expertise of the State ES and the State vocational education department to develop impact on manpower. Thus a State has potential for developing a meaningful coordinating role for itself; with skill and perhaps luck, it may even become a leading role.

In summary and comment on the experience in Ohio to date, the impact of the Office of Manpower Development (OMD) statewide, the SMSC, the use of 4 percent funds, and the use of 5 percent funds will be discussed.

The Impact of OMD

During closed-ended interviews with professional staff members in all prime sponsorships in the spring of 1976, the question was asked, What kind of impact has OMD had in your prime sponsorships since the beginning of CETA? Of the more than 100 staff members interviewed, only 8 (7 percent) thought that the State had had "much impact" (and 3 of them were staff members in an area that had been with the balance of State in fiscal 1975 and probably reflected that experience in their responses. An additional 14 percent felt that the State had had "some impact." Thirty-three percent said that the State manpower office had had "not much impact," 28 percent said it had had "no impact," and 17 percent had no opinion. Although the local prime sponsor staff members rarely expressed hostility to the State manpower office, for the most part they viewed it as largely irrelevant to their concerns and problems. They do not, at present, view the State office as either a resource or as a threat.

State Manpower Services Council (SMSC)

An active and involved SMSC can presumably develop some statewide influence. However, in Ohio, except for its role in dispersing 4 percent money and determining the formula for allocating 5 percent money, the SMSC has thus far had little impact.

In a very real sense, the SMSC in Ohio did not come into being until late July of 1975. The first council (in 1974) was very large (42 members) and had barely begun to organize itself when the gubernatorial election in November terminated its existence. The new council (now only 15 members) did not meet until late July 1975.

A useful way of analyzing the Ohio SMSC experience in summary fashion is to compare it with the "ideal" model developed by the National Governors' Conference (NGC).[3] The conference report made recommendations in 10 areas. The 1975-76 SMSC in Ohio was in accord with 4 of the 10 recommended characteristics. These were: (1) The existence of a separate staff assigned to the SMSC, (2) small size, (3) the existence of a committee structure, and (4) relatively frequent meetings (at intervals of not more than 2 months).

There were six areas in which the 1975-76 Ohio SMSC, by NGC standards, did not have characteristics that presumably would help lead to influence:

1. The NGC report recommended that the SMSC staff should be in the Governor's office or immediately in contact with the Governor. In Ohio, the SMSC staff was quite remote from the Governor's office.

2. The NGC report recommended that the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or close associate should chair and attend SMSC meetings. In Ohio, the Governor never attended (and the Lieutenant Governor was of the opposite party). The formal chairman, a close associate and department head, after the first few meetings no longer attended.

3. The NGC report recommended that the balance of State should be represented directly on the SMSC. This was not the case in Ohio, although it really caused few problems and may be an irrelevant recommendation for Ohio.

4. The NGC report recommended that the SMSC establish and implement a monitoring and evaluation system for all manpower activities in the State. In Ohio, the SMSC staff had just begun to monitor and evaluate the activities of projects funded with 4 percent funds but had taken no further action. Prime sponsors would certainly oppose evaluation of their activities and additional monitoring.

5. The NGC report recommended that the SMSC staff should undertake a "thorough, detailed review of prime sponsor and State agency plans." In Ohio, this has not been done (and would almost surely be opposed by the prime sponsors and perhaps by the State agencies).

6. The NGC report recommended that the SMSC and its staff take the lead in providing for the exchange of manpower information statewide. In Ohio, not much has been done in this area yet but there are some beginnings. The State staff has started issuing its own CETA letters, for example. And there was an abortive plan to hold hearings on CETA in four localities in early 1976.

[3] R.P. Goss, "State Manpower Services Councils: Promises—Problems—Progress" (Washington: National Governors' Conference, 1975).

Four-Percent Funds

The SMSC was unable to deal meaningfully with the question of priorities for 4 percent funds in either fiscal 1975 or fiscal 1976. In 1975, the newness of CETA coupled with short deadlines prevented activity. In 1976, the SMSC simply did not exist during the planning period.

For fiscal 1977, however, the SMSC and staff followed a much more organized process. The SMSC created a Plans and Proposals Committee, adopted a formal statement of priorities developed by the committee, and adopted a request-for-proposal process that was widely advertised. After the proposals were received, they were evaluated by the SMSC staff, who then made recommendations to the Plans and Proposals Committee. The committee made some changes in the recommendations and passed them on to the full SMSC, which also made some changes and then adopted the resulting package as its recommendations to the Governor.

The Governor's office, however, decided to ignore most of the SMSC recommendations. Of 13 recommended projects, only 3 were kept and 6 new ones were added by the Governor's office. Despite a 9-month process, there apparently was no communication between the SMSC and its staff and the Governor's office so that the final action came as a surprise and led at least some SMSC members to conclude they had been wasting their time. Seven of the nine projects funded were with State agencies and took about 80 percent of the funds. About a third of the money was for PSE slots with State agencies.

In the spring of 1976, staff members in the prime sponsorships were asked about their level of satisfaction with the allocation of 4 percent funds. None were very satisfied, about 12 percent satisfied, 13 percent neutral, 20 percent dissatisfied, and 12 percent very dissatisfied. Forty-four percent had no opinion. The very large proportion having no opinion probably simply did not know how the 4 percent money was being spent. Only 5 of the 17 prime sponsorships had membership on the SMSC, and those of the remaining 12 who had not personally been supportive of a given proposal had little reason to know (or care very much about) what had happened to the 4 percent money.

In 4 percent projects funded in fiscal 1975 and 1976, exoffenders were given considerable attention and State agencies received much of the money. This experience accords with that in many States.

Five-Percent Funds

For each of the 3 years of CETA, the SMSC adopted a different formula for allocating 5 percent vocational education funds. In the first year, a fairly complicated three-part formula was used. It was discarded in the second year because it had resulted in errors and could not handle the three new prime sponsorships that came into existence. In the second year, after lengthy debate at meetings (and in a committee), the best compromise that the SMSC could agree on was to use the title I formula for distributing 5 percent money. For the third year, the SMSC adopted a procedure whereby 10 percent of the total allocation will be taken off the top for funding special projects; the remaining 90 percent is to be allocated on the basis of the title I formula. The special projects will be tied to a general gubernatorial emphasis on industrial development.

In the spring of 1976 interviews, professional staff members in all prime sponsorships were asked about their level of satisfaction to that date with the allocation of 5 percent funds. About 4 percent were very satisfied, 16 percent satisfied, 11 percent neutral, 17 percent dissatisfied, and 14 percent very dissatisfied. Some 40 percent had no opinion. As in the case of the 4 percent funds, the extraordinarily large proportion of no opinion responses suggests that a fair number of professional staff members either do not know or do not care very much about 5 percent decisions. On the other hand, most prime sponsor staff members who worked with individuals from the Division of Vocational Education on 5 percent matters felt that the relationship was good.

VIII. THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL OFFICE

In this discussion of the role of the regional office, only one regional office (Region V in Chicago) and only the part of that office dealing with Ohio—Region V contains five other States—will be considered. Nevertheless, given both the actual and potential importance of regional offices in the implementation of CETA, it seemed important to discuss the regional office role despite the limited data base.

The report of September 1975 identified a number of problems with regional office performance. Although some of those problems remain, there is evidence that regional office personnel, like the prime sponsors, are learning to be more effective in their CETA role in some areas. Federal field representatives in particular seemed more comfortable working within the CETA framework in the second year than they had in the first year. They were generally more willing to accept a broad range of local decisions as authoritative. This may mean, of course, that some appropriate regional office functions are at least partially neglected. The strongest regional office performance probably came in areas that were not examined in detail, such as management information systems and financial reporting, because they were outside the scope of the project.

The following pages treat local perceptions of regional office impact and performance, the perceptions of the field representatives of the performance of the Employment and Training Administration's national office and regional office performance as it relates to decentralization, decategorization, and "citizen input" in the form of manpower planning councils. Decentralization, decategorization, and MPC's were chosen as substantive areas because there are national goals for these features of CETA that presumably the Department of Labor, especially through its regional offices, should help achieve.

Local Perceptions

In closed-ended interviews in spring 1976, professional staff members, political officials, service deliverers, and Federal representatives were asked a number of questions about the impact and influence of the regional office. The data on the influence of the Federal representatives on nine different decisionmaking areas have already been reported. Those data suggest that in a concrete, disaggregated sense the regional office, in the person of field representatives, is not very influential.

In a more general sense, however—and including the actions of all regional personnel—most actors perceive the regional office to be quite important in the implementation of CETA. The question was asked, "In general, how would you describe the impact that the regional Department of Labor has had in this prime sponsorship since CETA's inception?" The choice of answers were "a lot," "some," "not much," "none," or "no opinion." Table 29 reports the responses statewide by category of actor.

TABLE 29. PERCEIVED GENERAL IMPACT OF REGIONAL OFFICE ON OHIO PRIME SPONSORS

(Percent)

Amount of perceived impact	Staff (N=106)	Political officials (N=36)	Service deliverers (N=77)	Federal representatives (N=12)
A lot	58	31	42	50
Some	26	39	26	50
Not much	11	11	20	0
None	1	3	0	0
No opinion	5	17	13	0

To get specific opinions on the performance of RDOL in four important areas respondents were asked whether they were very satisfied, satisfied, neutral, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with performance in the following areas: (1) Reviewing prime sponsor plans, (2) providing technical assistance, (3) monitoring the effectiveness of prime sponsors, and (4) communicating with prime sponsors. Table 30 summarizes the responses of the actors. Table 31 reports the responses in a condensed form in two ways and omits the service deliverers, who have very little direct contact with the regional office. The first condensation in table 31 is the collapsing of the response categories into two: Very satisfied-satisfied and very dissatisfied-dissatisfied. The second condensation is the reporting of the ratio of the favorable to the unfavorable responses. Thus Table 31 provides both a magnitude measure and a ratio measure.

Tables 30 and 31 support the following observations:

1. Of the three groups with most knowledge about the regional office (staff, political officials, and Federal representatives themselves), the staff are the least satisfied with regional performance in all areas except monitoring (in which case the political officials are least satisfied). The Federal representatives are the most satisfied in all

TABLE 30. REGIONAL OFFICE PERFORMANCE IN OHIO, JUDGED BY MANPOWER ACTORS

[Percent]

Area of performance and level of satisfaction	Staff (N=106)	Political officials (N=36)	Service deliverers (N=77)	Federal representative (N=12)
Reviewing prime sponsor plans				
Very satisfied	9	6	11	9
Satisfied	41	38	35	39
Neutral	11	9	10	10
Dissatisfied	22	3	8	15
Very dissatisfied	9	6	7	8
Providing technical assistance				
Very satisfied	8	6	11	0
Satisfied	29	40	17	58
Neutral	13	3	10	8
Dissatisfied	33	14	19	25
Very dissatisfied	12	6	10	0
Monitoring prime sponsor effectiveness				
Very satisfied	5	9	7	0
Satisfied	38	24	25	50
Neutral	18	3	19	17
Dissatisfied	21	21	14	33
Very dissatisfied	12	12	6	0
Communicating				
Very satisfied	4	6	6	0
Satisfied	39	34	28	55
Neutral	13	11	15	18
Dissatisfied	25	11	13	18
Very dissatisfied	14	9	8	9

Note: Columns do not total 100 percent in some cases because of omission of individuals with no opinion.

TABLE 31. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS OF MANPOWER ACTORS ON REGIONAL OFFICE PERFORMANCE IN OHIO

[Percent]

Area of performance and level of satisfaction	Staff (N=106)	Political officials (N=36)	Federal representatives (N=12)
Reviewing prime sponsor plans			
Very satisfied and satisfied	50	44	48
Very dissatisfied and dissatisfied	31	9	23
Ratio of satisfied to dissatisfied	1.61	4.89	2.09
Providing technical assistance			
Very satisfied and satisfied	37	46	58
Very dissatisfied and dissatisfied	45	20	25
Ratio of satisfied to dissatisfied	0.82	2.30	2.32
Monitoring prime sponsor effectiveness			
Very satisfied and satisfied	43	33	50
Very dissatisfied and dissatisfied	33	33	33
Ratio of satisfied to dissatisfied	1.30	1.00	1.52
Communicating			
Very satisfied and satisfied	43	40	55
Very dissatisfied and dissatisfied	39	20	27
Ratio of satisfied to dissatisfied	1.10	2.00	2.04

Note: Percentages of individuals with no opinions or neutral are omitted.

cases except reviewing prime sponsor plans (in which case the political officials are the most satisfied).

2. With the exception of political officials and reviewing prime sponsor plans, the magnitude of dissatisfaction is sizable (20 percent or more in all cases) for all groups for all functions. This suggests that regional staff still have not convinced their contacts in prime sponsorships (staff and political officials) that they are performing well. In addition, field representatives themselves are not satisfied with regional office performance.

3. The groups of actors do not agree in their rank ordering of relative performance of the four functions. The agreement that the review of prime sponsor plans is carried out relatively satisfactorily is fairly high. The largest and most important disagreement is over technical assistance. Staff members are, in general, quite dissatisfied with regional office performance in this area, whereas the Federal representatives are the most satisfied. This suggests that the two groups may have different conceptions of the nature and content of useful technical assistance. It seems reasonable that the Department of Labor should take the staff members' perceptions and rank order seriously because they have most contact with the regional office, and ultimately probably also shape the political officials' opinions. This rank order is reasonably clear: Staff members believe the regional office performs most satisfactorily in plan review, next most satisfactorily in monitoring, next in communicating, and least in providing technical assistance. There also appears to be great dissatisfaction with regional office performance in all four areas on the part of staff particularly.

Note that an analysis of the responses in the aggregate hides a diversity among prime sponsorships. In some localities, almost all local actors rated regional office performance in negative terms in all areas, whereas in other localities, the response was almost uniformly positive. This reflects in part the differing personalities, types of activities, and levels of competence of individual field representatives because most local actors tend to personify the regional office in terms of their individual field representative.

Field Representatives' Perceptions

To find out how the federal representatives viewed their own position in the CETA system, they were asked for their assessment of national office performance. The Federal representatives are in a difficult position since they are, in both a personal and institutional sense, the Department of Labor. Only some elected officials and some chief staff persons come in contact with other Labor Department officials. The Federal representatives, therefore, if they are to affect local actions toward conformity to national policy preferences, must have clear guidance, and consistent policy, and good training. They require the support of their superiors in the regional and national offices for the positions they take.

On this point 12 Federal representatives responded. They were asked how well they thought the national office had performed four functions: (1) Communicating, (2) providing training to regional office personnel, (3) supporting regional positions, and (4) taking consistent policy positions. The table 32 summary of the answers makes it clear that Ohio field representatives are unhappy with national office performance on these specific functions. They feel they are not given what they need to meet the demands of the job of being a representative in the field and particularly lack training. In their dissatisfaction with communications from the national office, the respondents mentioned lack of clarity as well as inconsistency over time (the subject of a separate question that showed about the same response pattern).

TABLE 32. PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL OFFICE PERFORMANCE BY FEDERAL FIELD REPRESENTATIVES[1]

Level of satisfaction	Communications	Training provided regional personnel	Support for regional office positions	Consistency of policy positions
Very satisfied	0	0	0	0
Satisfied	8	8	8	0
Neutral	8	8	17	8
Dissatisfied	58	33	33	58
Very dissatisfied	25	42	33	25
No opinion	0	8	8	8

[1] N = 12

Decentralization

The statute transferred considerable decisionmaking authority from the Federal Government to prime sponsorships. Did the regional offices accept this transfer without a reluctance that resulted in needless and unproductive harrassment of prime sponsors? Given the inevitable shift of power from the regional offices to the prime sponsors despite harrassment, what kind of direction and technical assistance were the regional offices able to give local efforts as they acquired and used their new authority?

Acceptance of local authority by the regional office was inconsistent and reluctant during the first year of CETA; the second year showed greater consistency and diminishing reluctance. Considerable ambivalence still exists in the regional office (and also in the national office) about the Department of Labor's precise role in CETA. In some areas, the Department takes a hands-off attitude, and in others, there seems to be a substantial and constant increase in reporting requirements. There may be good reasons for selective action and inaction on the part of the Department. Those reasons, however, do not seem to have been articulated very clearly or consistently.

Regional office direction and technical assistance to local prime sponsors were generally viewed as far short of satisfactory (as the data in tables 30 and 31 show). In part, this was because the Federal representatives themselves had received only minimal training (see table 32).

Prime sponsor staff, when questioned about the quality of Labor Department technical assistance, generally asked in return, "What technical assistance?" One respondent expressed the view of many prime sponsor staff when he said, "In order to be able to give technical assistance, you have to know more than the fellow you are giving it to. Unfortunately, the regional office staff don't know any more than we do."

Another aspect of regional office guidance of decentralization has to do with the guidance (or lack of guidance) given to prime sponsors on protecting a special place for the most disadvantaged participants in title I programs. As indicated in an earlier section, there seems to have been little regional office activity in this direction and, in fact, both national policy and regional activity seem to have pushed in the opposite direction. Despite the provision in the law that "to the maximum extent feasible manpower services, including the development of job opportunities, will be provided to those most in need of them, including low-income persons and persons of limited English-speaking ability," very little regional office activity in support of that provision was observed. This is one area in which an active regional (and national) policy seemed clearly warranted by the statute, but it was an area in which a hands-off policy appeared to be in force much of the time.

Decategorization

Perhaps the broadest meaning of decategorization is that prime sponsors are expected to develop comprehensive manpower programs for their localities that offer a range of services for the eligible population and that are accessible to all eligible residents in the prime sponsorship. Admittedly, accomplishing this goal is a large and long-term job that cannot be achieved immediately or, given limited resources, cannot be achieved fully. At the creation of CETA, however, it was implied that the Department of Labor would offer local prime sponsorships some concrete guidance in defining and creating comprehensive manpower programs. Thus far, at least in a reading of Labor Department documents and observation of regional office behavior in relation to Ohio, little evidence appears of Federal insistence on decategorization in any sense, nor of Federal guidance in the definition and creation of comprehensive programs.

When the field representatives were asked about their understanding of decategorization and comprehensiveness, they could not respond. Prime sponsor staff members were unanimous in the view that neither regional office personnel nor Labor Department publications offered any aid at all in planning a decategorized and/or comprehensive program.

To judge by the six areas that were included in the field assessment conducted in April and May 1976, the Department of Labor is not ready to assess local prime sponsor performance in simple decategorization, much less in building a comprehensive program.[1] None of the categories used in the field assessment touch on either decategorization or comprehensiveness.

No doubt prime sponsors (and national interest groups particularly responsive to their wishes) would be content to have DOL ignore the question of program design (and, thereby, such questions as implementing decategorization and creating comprehensive programs). But the rhetoric of CETA and the aspirations of at least some interested members of Congress and some of the ETA leadership suggest that there is a desire for DOL to work in this area. But from what was seen in Ohio, performance to date has been virtually absent.

Manpower Planning Councils

The use and representativeness of advisory manpower planning councils was one of the six areas chosen for formal assessment by the Labor Department in both 1975 and 1976. Consequently, the regional office had to give at least formal attention to MPC's in Ohio. Beyond this, however, regional office attention was sporadic. In a few cases, actions by the Federal representative and his or her supervisors directly resulted in the reconstitution or the activation of a local MPC. On the other hand, in some areas, councils just as ineffective, seemingly unrepresentative, or ignored as those that received explicit criticism, had no attention from regional personnel. A small start was made in fiscal 1976 toward promotion of active councils but a great deal more remains to be done.

[1] For a brief but accurate summary of the areas included in the 1976 field assessment, see "CETA Assessment Focuses on Six Areas" (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, 1976).

IX. SUMMARY

Local Decisionmaking Influence

1. On title I decisions:
   a. The professional staff is dominant.
   b. Political officials have considerable influence, especially when dollar allocations are at stake.
   c. Manpower planning councils (MPC's) range from a position of no importance in some prime sponsorships to the highest level of importance in a few. They tend to be more important in areas where political officials are not involved.
   d. Service deliverers retain particular importance in choosing clients but nowhere are they dominant. Their influence has declined since the beginning of CETA.
   e. Federal representatives in a personal sense have little influence.
2. On public service employment decisions:
   a. Political officials are dominant on the question of allocation of slots to agencies. They are also generally important on all aspects of PSE.
   b. Professional staff members, however, retain a great deal of influence in PSE matters.
   c. Other actors have almost no influence on PSE decisions.
3. The above patterns are general; there is considerable variation between prime sponsorships and different patterns can be described that apply to numerous cases. Factors explaining the emergence of different patterns include staff experience, the level of political official interest in CETA, the attitude of professional staff and political officials toward the involvement of other actors (especially MPC's), the location of the manpower staff in the structure of local government, the form of local government (for example, strong mayor vs. city manager), and general economic conditions (specifically, relatively high unemployment).

Title I Program Component Choices

1. In general, training programs (classroom and on-the-job) have been reduced in importance over time and employment programs (work experience and PSE) have increased in importance.
2. More prime sponsorships were able to achieve their planned expenditures and participant levels in fiscal 1976 than fiscal 1975, which provides some evidence of improved management capacity. But many still achieve below 85 percent of their plans.
3. Differing program emphases are best explained by three factors: Previous programmatic emphases, environmental constraints (density of population, manufacturing jobs per capita, the number of existing vocational education facilities), and the preferences of manpower decisionmakers.

Title I Service Deliverers

1. Manpower actors feel that four factors play particular importance in explaining the choice of deliverers: The absence of alternative deliverers, prior program decisions, prior client group decisions, and the quality of previous deliverer performance.
2. Changes (both increases and decreases) in service deliverer budgets between fiscal 1975 and 1976 were associated with the existence and use of evaluations of

deliverers by prime sponsor staffs, the involvement of political officials, and the involvement of MPC's. Entrenched deliverers are no longer in a consistently favored position.

3. Although limited progress has been made, the employment service still has serious problems in relating to CETA in a way satisfactory to prime sponsorships. The most pressing problem continues to be overcentralization of ES.

Public Service Employment Program Choices

1. There was evidence of only a weak relationship between level of unemployment and title I PSE spending.

2. There was a very strong relationship between local budget problems and the decision to use PSE money to rehire laid-off local employees.

3. There is low transition to permanent employment from titles II (18 percent) and VI (34 percent). Variation between prime sponsorships (a few of which are doing very well) is not explained by unemployment rates. In general, those who focused most heavily on PSE (including significant use of title I money) did least well in their transition rates.

4. There is almost no concern with any additional aspect of career growth for PSE jobs, primarily because staff members give no meaningful priority to it.

5. The highest proportion of PSE slots went to regular local government agencies where any two of the following three conditions are present: (1) There have been layoffs of local public employees; (2) the political officials state preferences for such distribution; and (3) the political officials are perceived to be very influential in the distribution of PSE jobs.

Participants in CETA Programs

1. Title I participants are very different from both title II and title VI participants. They have less formal education and are much more likely to be black, economically disadvantaged, female, and young.

2. Over time, title II participants have come to resemble title VI participants on most characteristics (although they are still more likely to be black). This is one piece of evidence (and there are a number of others in the report) that very few actors remember or care about the theoretically different purposes of titles II and VI.

3. Service to the economically disadvantaged has stabilized for title II and VI at levels well below title I. Service to the disadvantaged with title I continues to decline at a steady rate.

4. Titles I and II continue to increase service to those with more formal education; title VI has stabilized service to this group at a very high level.

5. The proportion of black participants is declining in all three titles.

6. The above aggregate generalizations mask many local variations. At least some prime sponsorships provide service levels that run counter to both State and national trends.

7. The following explanations of variations in patterns of participants being served by CETA programs are supported:

   a. The attitudes of the manpower actors about preferred participant characteristics are important.

   b. Decisions about the nature of programs and the agencies who receive contracts also affect who the participants are likely to be.

   c. The history of service patterns explains some of the present patterns.

   d. The actual universe of need (as measured by the ES active file) had some impact, but it was not controlling. Intervening were the perceptions of service deliverers and staff members about changes in the universe of need and general economic conditions (perceptions usually based on impressions, not relevant data). Thus, for example, the relative need for service to blacks decreased but actual service declined much more rapidly. The need for service to the economically disadvantaged remained stable but service to this group declined substantially in title I and remained below need levels for titles II and VI.

   e. National policy and regional Department of Labor actions accentuated trends diminishing relative service levels to economically disadvantaged persons and black persons.

The Role of the State

1. Decisionmaking influence for the balance of State is loose, unstructured, and shifting. Planning is largely decentralized and administration is largely centralized. The professional staff at the State level is gradually gaining more influence, however.

2. The State in its mandated role as coordinator of employment and training services is largely irrelevant to

manpower actors in the local prime sponsorships. The staff of the State Manpower Services Council is viewed as neither a resource nor a threat.

3. Except for its role in dispersing 4 percent money and determining the formula for allocating 5 percent money, the SMSC has had little impact in Ohio. In both fiscal 1975 and fiscal 1976, the SMSC was unable to deal meaningfully with the question of priorities for 4 percent funds. Thus far, for fiscal 1977, a more orderly process has been followed and priorities have been explicitly developed and adopted. A different formula has been used for each of the 3 years of CETA for 5 percent money. The latest takes 10 percent off the top to use in line with a general gubernatorial emphasis on industrial development and distributes the remaining 90 percent to the prime sponsors on the basis of the title I formula.

The Role of the Regional Office

1. There is evidence that regional office personnel are learning to be more efficient and effective in carrying out their understanding of CETA in some areas. Field representatives in particular seemed more willing to accept a range of local decisions as authoritative in the second year of CETA compared to the first. They seemed relatively unsure, however, what national goals they should pursue and how.

2. Despite the Federal representatives' lack of personal influence, the regional office seemed very important locally in its overall impact.

3. There was a high degree of dissatisfaction with regional office performance by local staff, political officials, and the Federal representatives themselves. The staffs were the most critical. There was general agreement that the regional office performed relatively well in terms of reviewing prime sponsor plans. But there was much greater dissatisfaction with its performance in providing technical assistance, monitoring prime sponsor effectiveness, and communicating clearly and in timely fashion.

4. Field representatives were very dissatisfied with national office communications, consistency, training, and support for the regional office.

5. The regional office was not perceived by local staff members to offer much useful technical assistance.

6. The regional office gave local prime sponsors no guidance on the meaning or implementation of decategorization or the development of comprehensive programs.

7. In a few cases, regional office actions directly resulted in the reconstitution or the activation of a local MPC. In some other areas, however, MPC's just as ineffective, seemingly unrepresentative, or ignored as those receiving explicit criticism received no attention from the regional office.

Summing Up

1. There are three major problem areas in CETA:

   a. Service to the most disadvantaged of eligible CETA participants is diminishing with title I and has stabilized at relatively low levels with titles II and VI.

   b. In many prime sponsorships, PSE considerations seem to have diminished attention to the title I training and work experience programs. Dollar resources are reduced if title I money is used for PSE slots and, even more important, creative attention on the part of staff and especially political officials is reduced.

   c. The Federal role in CETA—it could emphasize a few national goals and guide prime sponsorships toward achieving them—remains somewhat vague and shifting and, to the extent that it has a focus, that focus is on the mechanics, rather than the substance, of local management.

2. There are three areas in which CETA has achieved significant successes:

   a. Some prime sponsors have used the latitude granted them to develop some innovative and seemingly successful programs. Although there are national and statewide trends in terms of programmatic and participant emphases, some prime sponsors have successfully gone counter to those trends in creative ways. This suggests that the latitude is genuine and can be used creatively even in the face of both political and economic pressures that push in other directions.

   b. The CETA system—especially the local manpower staff—has been growing in professionalism. And growing professionalism has been accompanied by learning from experience, development of management capacity (in both the substantive and mechnical senses), and often improved program performance.

   c. In at least a few areas, there has been meaningful and influential community involvement in CETA decisionmaking through the manpower planning councils.

X. CONCLUSIONS

The specific conclusions of the study were summarized in the preface of this report and were elaborated in the pages that followed. In this section (1) a brief assessment and revision of the basic model of important relationships is offered; (2) a broader meaning is sought of the patterns observed; (3) policy recommendations are given.

A Model for Aspects of CETA Implementation

Much of this report explains some aspects of the implementation of CETA in 16 prime sponsorships in Ohio. A general diagram (chart 1) was used to help in asking certain questions systematically. The authors' judgments about what relationships would prove important in an explanatory sense turned out, in general, to be supported by the analysis.

The following kinds of relationships were present and help explain a variety of dependent variables:

1. Patterns of local decisionmaking influence were explained in part by (a) basic orientations and attitudes of actors in the manpower system; (b) staff structure and local government features; (c) economic conditions as measured by unemployment.

2. Title I program component choices were explained in part by (a) previous program choices; (b) environmental constraints (population density, manufacturing jobs per capita, number of existing vocational education facilities); (c) preferences of decisionmakers.

3. Choices of title I service deliverers were explained in part by (a) prior program component decisions; (b) prior decisions about client groups; (c) the presence or absence of alternative deliverers; (d) prior performance of deliverers.

4. Changes in title I service deliverer budgets were explained in part by (a) evaluation of service deliverer performance (both formal and informal) by prime sponsor staff; (b) the involvement of political officials and MPC's.

5. PSE program choices were explained in part by (a) economic conditions (both unemployment and the fiscal condition of local governments); (b) attitudes and preferences of actors; (c) the influence of political officials.

6. Patterns of client service were explained in part by (a) prior service deliverer choices; (b) prior program component decisions; (c) economic conditions (especially changes in universe of need); (d) actors' perceptions of economic conditions and their impact on changes in universe of need; (e) actor preferences; (f) local decisionmaking influence patterns; (g) national policy and regional office activities.

When these specific explanatory variables are aggregated and compared to the initial statement about relationships as summarized in chart 1, some moderate revisions in that initial statement seem warranted. Chart 2 contains a summary of that modification as now supported by considerable empirical evidence.

In chart 2 the label "local environmental constraints" is used to include such specific factors as staff structure and local governmental features; labor market, institutional, and demographic features; and aspects of the history of manpower programs and delivery agents. These titles encompass all of the explanatory factors indicated in the outline above in points 1b, 2a, 2b, 3c,3d, and 4a.

The label "local economic conditions" was thought important enough to focus on separately although it is also a local constraint. Three conditions were investigated and found to be important: Unemployment, local fiscal condition, and universe of need. (It should be added, however, that none of these factors alone or in combination satisfactorily accounted for all of the variation in any phenomenon investigated. This suggests that only a minimum of economic determinism is at work in

Chart 2.
Empirically Supported Model of CETA Implementation Features in Prime Sponsorships


Local environmental constraints
Local economic conditions
National policy and regional office activity
Local decisionmaking influence patterns
Individual actor perceptions, attitudes, and preferences
Program decisions
Patterns of client service

CETA.) "Local economic conditions" encompasses the explanatory factors indicated in points 1c, 5a, and 6c above.

The label "national policy and regional office activity" is self-explanatory. It encompasses the explanatory variable in point 6g above.

The label "individual actor perceptions, attitudes, and preferences" encompasses the explanatory variables in points 1a, 2c, 5b, 6d, and 6e.

The label "local decisionmaking influence patterns" encompasses the dependent variable in point 1 and the explanatory variables in points 4b, 5c, and 6f.

The label "program decisions" encompasses dependent variables used in points 2, 3, 4, and 5 above and also encompasses the explanatory variables used in points 3a, 6a, and 6b.

The label "patterns of client service" encompasses the dependent variable in point 6 and the explanatory variable in point 3b.

CETA as a Decisionmaking and Policy System

Either knowingly or not, Congress created in CETA a decisionmaking and policy system that has four principal characteristics.

1. It is a highly politicized system. This is partly by design through the stress on the local elected official responsiveness to voters presumably concerned with CETA (this is probably mostly myth, at least thus far). It is also partly unavoidable, given that localities must make allocative decisions about resources that are nowhere large enough to cover the needs of all the eligible population.

2. As with any general or special revenue sharing program, CETA is partly a way of transforming redistributive

issues into distributive issues.[1] In authorizing categorical manpower programs, Congress typically wrote statutes that in effect mandated the eligible population to be the most disadvantaged and thereby selected them to receive Federal benefits redistributed from other classes in society through the tax system. In CETA, the "clients" of the Federal Government have become States and localities. Now stress is on the total size of the dollar allocation to CETA followed by the automatic allocation of that money to units of government. CETA thus appears to be primarily a subsidy (a distribution) to other units of government supported by Federal tax dollars. The harder choices of who gets what at the expense of whom in personal or class terms are largely avoided by Congress. To the extent that redistributive questions are discussed and decided by government, that discussion is likely to take place either in the Federal bureaucracy that still has some supervisory power (the Employment and Training Administration) or at the local level. Both of these sets of governmental apparatus, however, may also avoid such inevitably controversial questions in any direct and explicit fashion—the Federal bureaucracy almost totally and the local governments in large part.

If the question of redistribution is avoided both by Federal and local governments this does not mean that redistribution does not take place. Both the Federal allocation formulas and the concrete choices of service deliverers have redistributive implications evident in the former case and less evident in the latter. MPC's could, theoretically, bring open discussion of redistributive questions into the CETA system. But they, too, may wish to avoid this kind of controversy even in those relatively few cases in which they have acquired substantial influence in local CETA decisionmaking.

In short, CETA may well be a policy system in which the question of who gets what at the expense of whom in both personal and class terms simply is not dealt with directly by anyone and these choices are made bit by bit, seemingly unconsciously, and seemingly inevitably.

3. CETA is a system wherein (a) local prime sponsors theoretically have great decisionmaking latitude, (b) the Federal Government plays an ambiguous role despite considerable resources at its disposal, and (c) the States have an ambiguous role because of rhetoric making them responsible for central coordination combined with the granting of relatively few tangible resources.

4. In the CETA system it is difficult to evaluate the performance of prime sponsors, because of the latitude granted them and the amorphous character of national goals for CETA. Even in some categorical programs, Congress built in enough latitude for local variation to make it difficult to judge effectiveness.[2] In CETA and other special revenue-sharing programs these judgments become even harder to make.

Within the context described above, in broad terms, what has happened? The authors' general conclusion, based on careful observation of CETA in one State for two years and a reading of the literature on CETA all over the nation, is that there are some serious problems in CETA that require attention but that there are also considerable accomplishments at the local level and some encouraging signs. It would certainly be premature to conclude that CETA has "failed" or "succeeded."

The principal problems observed can be summarized briefly:

1. Service to the most disadvantaged of eligible CETA clients is diminishing with title I and has stabilized at relatively low levels with titles II and VI.

2. In many prime sponsorships, PSE considerations seem to have diminished attention to the title I training and work-experience programs. Dollar resources are reduced if title I money is used for PSE slots and, even more important, creative attention on the part of staff and especially political officials is reduced.

3. The Federal role in CETA, which potentially could focus on a few national goals and help guide prime sponsorships toward achieving them, remains somewhat vague and shifting and, to the extent it has a focus, that focus is on the mechanics—not the substance—of local management.

The principal achievements noted during the study can also be summarized briefly:

1. Some prime sponsors have used the latitude granted them to develop innovative and seemingly successful programs. Although there are national and statewide trends in programmatic and participant emphases, some prime sponsors have successfully gone counter to those trends in creative ways. This suggests that the latitude is genuine and can be used creatively even in the face of both political and economic pressures that push in other directions.

2. There has been growing professionalization of the CETA system, especially in local manpower staff (who were, in many instances, manpower professionals well before CETA). Growing professionalization has been accompanied by learning from experience, development of management capacity, and, in many cases, improved program performance.

3. In at least a few areas there has been meaningful and influential community involvement in CETA decisionmaking through the MPC's.

Recommendations

Recommendations follow in six general areas. Three are in what might be called program content areas—

[1] For discussions of redistributive and distributive issues and decisionmaking, see T.J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, July 1964, pp. 677-715, and R.B. Ripley and G.A. Franklin, *Congress, The Bureaucracy, and Public Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1976).

[2] See, for example, M. Derthick, *The Influence of Federal Grants: Public Assistance in Massachusetts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

client service patterns, program comprehensiveness, and public service employment. Three have to do primarily with specific institutions in the implementation of CETA—manpower planning councils, the regional office of the Department of Labor, and the State.

The format adopted in each of the six areas is the same. A general goal is assumed and then suggestions are made about what might be changed to reach that goal. Because actors in the system may not share these goals, the formula is used that *if* X is the goal *then* steps Y, Z, and so on ought to be taken to reach it.

Client Service Patterns and the Quality of Data for Program Analysis

If a goal of CETA is to promote careful monitoring of client service patterns to protect the most disadvantaged among the eligible clients then the following steps might be taken:

1. The regulations could be rewritten to stress the economically disadvantaged as a target group.

2. The regional office could monitor more closely the agreement between prime sponsors' client service patterns and actual need in the area. Specific plans could be required on the action being taken and the need would have to be documented.

3. The regional office could also monitor performance to insure that the universe of need was being dealt with according to plan.

4. The Department of Labor could lead in addressing the problem of quality of data for making the judgments implied by points 2 and 3 above. This problem has three major aspects.

First, relevent data must be available and interpretable at the local level. Now most prime sponsors simply do not have that data available. ES data are either irrelevant or not easily available. Census data are either outdated or aggregated at the wrong level. There is no agreement on how to measure universe of need. Some of the definitions of participants and their characteristics are not clear. Data on clients—even where relatively good for an entire prime sponsorship—are typically not available by program or by geographic subdivision.

The Department of Labor could attack the problems both by mandating certain kinds of data collection and reporting and by aiding in the development of useful concepts and data. Prime sponsors could be required, for example, to report participant characteristic data broken down both by major program component, by service deliverer, and by major geographic subdivision (all individual program agents for titles II and VI). They could also be required to compile longitudinal trend analyses of a simple character on changing participant characteristics by title, by program component, by service deliverer, and by PSE program agent. Simultaneously, the Department could develop an authoritative definition of universe of need and work with the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the employment service and the Bureau of the Census to develop reliable and usable data available routinely to prime sponsors for measuring universe of need.

Parenthetically speaking, the significant segment data now required on the reports are probably more distracting than useful in their present form. The significant segments could either be dropped or, at minimum, chosen from a standardized list.

Second, local prime sponsors must be given some incentives for collecting and using good data. Even clear requirements in the regulations might not produce the desired performance. At present, the incentive structure seems to promote sloppiness and perhaps deliberate manipulation of numbers to please a given Federal representative or regional office.

Some negative incentives are suggested above—that is, if the RDOL monitoring of prime sponsor performance in this area were serious and well executed, presumably prime sponsors not performing well might be open to delays in funding, letters to political officials, and possibly MPC's specifying shortcomings, and so on. But since the ultimate sanction—refusal to release the allocated funds—has never been used and is not likely to be used, it also seems wise to seek some positive incentives for good data collection and reporting. Perhaps it would be worth experimenting with, using a modest amount of discretionary money, to induce the kind of performance that is desired. A few pilot prime sponsorships could be financed first and/or a sliding scale of payment (theoretically and perhaps actually for extra staff persons and/or time) could be developed for all prime sponsorships depending on the level of quality achieved (that is, some of the funds would not be released until the regional office had assessed the quality of the work).

Third, once an improved system of data collection and reporting is in place, occasional field audits of the accuracy of the data being collected must be made. Prime sponsor (or regional office) staff could undertake this task with regard to service deliverers and program agents.

Program Comprehensiveness

If promotion of program comprehensiveness is a CETA goal, then the following steps might be taken:

1. The Department of Labor could define comprehensiveness in a meaningful way considering elements such as areawide programs, client eligibility unrestricted by geographic limits within a prime sponsorship, a balanced program mix, geographical program balance, decategori-

zation, consolidation of program functions, and lack of redundant duplication of programs.

2. The Department could also fund demonstration projects to show how a comprehensive program might be structured and to evaluate its impact. The results of such projects should be disseminated clearly and concisely to all prime sponsors.

3. The consortium incentive money could be tied to progress toward achieving comprehensiveness rather than given out automatically by the Department.

4. The Labor Department could also set aside other discretionary money to use as incentive money for inducing prime sponsorships that are not consortia to develop comprehensive programs.

5. Training of regional office personnel in the meaning of comprehensiveness and the details of how to work toward it could be undertaken. When that training was completed, personnel could then similarly train local prime sponsor staff members.

Public Service Employment

If putting PSE in a perspective and position in which it does not dominate other CETA programs is a goal, then several actions might be taken:

1. The Labor Department could set a limit on the percentage or amount of title I money that could be spent for PSE (this would probably require congressional action). The limit might be quite low but could be increased at specific levels of local unemployment (that is, a trigger mechanism would be used to recognize explicitly the possible value of additional PSE jobs as a countercyclical measure).

2. The Department could urge and, if necessary, require that prime sponsors spend at least a modest portion of their PSE funds on providing a training component to the slots. This could take the form of a flat percentage requirement, a sliding percentage requirement (as the amount of PSE spending went up the percentage might also go up), or an incentive system (so many local dollars above a minimum spent on training would generate additional Federal discretionary dollars).

3. Local prime sponsor staff could include a number of top-level individuals familiar with the operations under all three titles. This would promote better total management and integration of all CETA programs and ideally would allow them to keep PSE in control. (Some staffs are, of course, already organized this way.)

4. The Labor Department could begin a systematic investigation of the costs and benefits of proposing the ultimate separation of PSE (at least title VI) from the rest of CETA. This would, of course, require congressional action.

Citizen Input Through Manpower Planning Councils

If promotion of MPC activity and influence is a CETA goal, several actions might be taken (some of these have been taken either partially or in some local areas, but none has been taken fully or in all prime sponsorships):

1. Local political officials and staff could encourage an active and influential council by providing adequate staffing, good and complete information well before decision deadlines, and personal encouragement and appreciation of individuals' work as council members. The regional office could monitor the adequacy of staffing and information.

2. The presence of the Federal representative for a prime sponsorship at all or most council meetings could be useful in developing and sustaining a council's importance. Such presence would show the Department's high priority on council participation in decisionmaking and also, in effect, would provide the council with authoritative staff advice on questions of both fact and interpretation.

3. The regional office could provide technical assistance to MPC's so that the members would be in a position to take more initiative in carrying out an important role for themselves.

4. The regional office could refuse to accept prime sponsors' plans unless those plans were accompanied by evidence of MPC review and participation in decisionmaking. (This review and participation might, of course, leave the council in dissent or disagreement, at least on some issues. Agreement would not be a criterion for regional acceptance, given the advisory nature of the MPC.)

5. A dual council structure could be used, at least experimentally, by a few prime sponsors. If it were found to be useful then the regulations could be changed to make it universal.

In a dual structure the manpower planning council would be composed of individuals broadly representative of interested and involved groups in the community (including programmatic participants), but it would not contain funded CETA operators, their representatives, or public officials. Staff members and public officials would be invited to attend meetings but would not be members. Members would continue to be appointed by the prime sponsor but with more monitoring by the regional office to make sure that the council was, in fact, broadly representative. The chairman of the council would be elected by the members themselves rather than being designated by the prime sponsor. This council would discuss broad policy matters such as the relative emphases on types of programs, relative emphases on types of participants, relative emphasis on PSE and on the transition to permanence in PSE, and level of funding for specific

deliverers. Its reaction to plans for all titles would continue to be required before the region approved funding, although it would continue to be advisory. If the prime sponsor rejected the council's advice, the region could, after examining the issues, still approve funding.

The second council—a coordinating body—would deal with operational matters. It would be made up primarily of professional staff members from the prime sponsorship and from the various service deliverers. It would also have as members operators of other manpower programs not funded by CETA and representatives of programs with major manpower implications. Elected officials would be invited to observe (but probably would rarely do so). There would also be some representatives of the clients of some of the major manpower programs. The coordinating body and its chairman would be appointed by the chief elected official in the prime sponsorship and probably the chief professional staff person for the prime sponsor would be designated as chairman.

This dual arrangement would have at least three major benefits: (1) It would focus the attention of the planning council on policy issues (now they are often distracted by operating issues they do not understand and cannot really affect). (2) It would reduce the possibility that the planning council would simply become a rubber stamp for officials and/or funded operators, and it would create a working body that could, if it so desired, deal with important operational issues in an open and shared context.

The Role of the Regional Office

If promoting a focused and useful role for regional offices of the Department of Labor is a CETA goal, several actions might be taken:

1. The function of the Federal field representative could be defined more clearly in terms of specific features of prime sponsor performance to be monitored and specific areas for useful technical assistance to be delivered.

2. Once these areas for monitoring and technical assistance were defined then much more extensive and rigorous training of field representatives could be given.

3. In many substantive areas, the principal role of regional office personnel could be to help develop expertise at the prime sponsor level.

4. Turnover in field representative assignments could be reduced and individual representatives could stay with one geographical assignment for a long enough period of time to develop enough knowledge to be useful (but probably not so long as to be completely coopted by the local staff).

5. In addition to having a geographical assignment, each Federal representative could receive extra training in a specialty (data analysis, fiscal management, management information systems, program design, and so on) and then serve as a member of a team that could extend special training and/or monitoring to the local level.

6. There could be an effort to reduce drastically the information overload currently imposed on the prime sponsorships.

The Role of the State

If promoting a meaningful and useful role for States is a CETA goal, several actions could be taken. (These suggestions are directed to the Office of Manpower Development (OMD) in Ohio, but some no doubt have relevance to other States, too.)

1. OMD could use any leverage it has with ES to reduce areas of tension between ES and individual prime sponsorships. If problems develop between the Division of Vocational Education and prime sponsorships, OMD could perform the same function in those cases.

2. OMD could in special situations play a useful intermediary role between all prime sponsorships in the State and the regional office.

3. OMD could lead in developing relevant data for use by prime sponsors, which would increase its credibility with the prime sponsors. It would also be useful for the SMSC as it considers manpower programs throughout the State and particularly as it makes choices about 4- and 5-percent fund allocations.

4. OMD could sponsor workshops in functional areas for members of prime sponsor staffs below the level of chief of staff.

5. OMD could take the lead in disseminating research and development products in the employment and training field throughout the State.

6. In managing the balance-of-State prime sponsorship OMD could do the following: (a) Clarify the role of the RMSC's and their linkages to the State prime sponsor council and decisionmaking at the State level; (b) expand the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the State staff in assessing BOS deliverer performance (including that by ES and other State agencies engaged in delivery).

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Where to Get More Information

For more information on this and other programs of research and development funded by the Employment and Training Administration, contact the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. 20213, or any of the Regional Administrators for Employment and Training whose addresses are listed below.

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